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Preface 
This book is the winner of the Africa Thesis Award 2010. The 
jury’s report included the following comments: 
 
“Michal sketches a historically informed picture of how perspec-
tives of coal and coalmining in particular have changed over the 
years, from a source of wealth and comfort to a major polluter. (…) 
Interesting in Michal’s approach is that she tries to locate and 
contextualise the concept of ‘pollution’ both in the domain of the 
general public as well as in the domain of the production of 
scientific knowledge on pollution. The perspectives of the general 
public were particularly informed by literally seeing, smelling, 
hearing the physical evidence of air pollution, destruction of land, 
and underground fires. (…) The jury of the Africa Thesis Award 
was unanimous in their opinion that Michal Singer’s thesis is of the 
utmost societal relevance, not only in South Africa, but actually 
worldwide. (…) To conclude: the thesis is solidly structured, well-
written, lavishly referenced, and has a clear scientific point to make 
as the above makes clear. On this basis the jury was unanimous in 
its decision to award Michal Singer the Africa Thesis Award 2010.” 
 
  
 
   
 
For all the arts of peace coal is needed;  
if war breaks out it is needed all the more. In time of revolution the  
miner must go on working or the revolution must stop, for revolution as  
much as reaction needs coal. 
 
– George Orwell, Down the Mine 
 
* 
 
Obtain at last that the reward of your toil may come to you in its entirety 
… 
 Yes! That all the sweetness of the air, all the rays of the sun and all the 
invitations of happiness may be at last allowed to reach you. 
 
– Andre Gide, Fruits of the Earth 
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Introduction 
“I am known as the Coal City 
No other land can rival my production 
But I remain poor and destitute and my  
People suffer the wound inflicted by the 
Greedy.”1 
 
This work examines changing ideas about the environment in light of new 
knowledge arising from both scientific and environmental arenas. The ‘state’ of 
the Coal City described in the poem above has provided physical evidence of the 
severe impact of coal-based pollution in South Africa’s carbon-rich Witbank 
coalfields. This book is based on a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of 
Humanities of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in South 
Africa, in February, 2010, in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts in History. The dissertation was supervised by Peter N. Delius and 
co-supervised by Muchaparara Musemwa. 
The study explores the departure from positive perspectives of coal as a source 
of wealth and comfort, to more current anxieties based on knowledge of coal as a 
major polluter. This study covers the period between 1906 and 1978, when the 
increasing role of opencast coal production led to the exponential growth of the 
coal industry. It provides an historical analysis of changing ideas around coal and 
its environmental impact. Special reference to the Witbank coalfield between 
1906 and 1978 provides a unique representation of how South African coal 
mining was perceived in the early twentieth century, particularly in revealing 
how these ideas were shaped by the appearance of different manifestations of 
coal-based pollution in the region.  
                                                 
1  Lucas Komana, ‘Emalahleni’, Witbank News, March 15, 2002  
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Each chapter provides a thematic representation of different aspects of coal-
based pollution as they manifested over the course of the twentieth century. The 
first chapter highlights how early signs of environmental change were easily 
ignored by state and industry, owing to limited understanding of the broader 
impact of pollution, as well as the localized impact of early signs of pollution. 
The introduction of electricity by the early 1920s enabled the growth of the 
Witbank coal industry. The impact of this development is assessed in the second 
chapter, which explores how local industry was stimulated by the needs of the 
Second World War. This resulted in greater signs of pollution, and signaled a 
shift in the way pollution was understood in the region. National responses to 
intensified atmospheric pollution between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s 
resulted in the development of South Africa's first legislation related directly to 
the growing problem of pollution, the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 
(APPA) of 1965. The third chapter provides insights into the way pollution was 
understood during this time by assessing the ideas that influenced the nature of 
the Act. The final chapter reviews responses to the APPA by the Witbank coal 
industry. It also explores the way in which water pollution was understood in 
light of the appearance of severe mine water pollution. The central concern of 
this study is to demonstrate an evolution of the ideas that shaped the way in 
which South African coal-based pollution has been conceived. The study thus 
reflects how and why these ideas have changed over time. 
The moment that inspired the study in this direction took place in June 2007 at 
a public meeting which I attended held at the Lake Chrissie Lodge in Lake 
Chrissie, the historic village named after and founded on the shore of the largest 
fresh-water lake in southern Africa. This large pan also forms part of the eco-
system of South Africa’s Mpumalanga Lakes District, threatened by the prospect 
of large-scale opencast coal mining throughout the Mpumalanga province. The 
tensions between different members of the local community underscored the 
political significance of issues around coal-based pollution, and sparked curiosity 
about how these conflicts emerged.2  
Witnessing the way in which the local politics of a community were affected 
by the conflict of ideas around coal-based pollution inspired much of the research 
which took place over the course of this study. Preliminary interviews explored 
the local environmental politics and attempted to gauge perspectives on local 
attitudes towards coal mining and its environmental impacts.3 This highlighted 
                                                 
2  Personal notes on discussion with Koos Pretorius, Lake Chrissie Lodge, Lake Chrissie, Mpumalanga, 
June, 2007 
3  See Interview with Christelle Pauw, Lake Chrissie, June 26, 2007; Interview with Mohammed Dindar, 
Lake Chrissie, June 26, 2007; Interview with Vusi Ngwenya, Kwachibikulu (Lake Chrissie), June 27, 
2007; Interview with Nico Steinberg & Ane Steinberg, Lake Chrissie, June 28, 2007; Interview with 
Hannes Botha, Carolina, June 28, 2007. 
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the need for a unit of study that could reflect the historical evolution of ideas 
around coal-based pollution.  
This book provides a critical study of changing conceptions of the environ-
mental impact of South African coal mining, with special reference to the Wit-
bank coalfield in Mpumalanga Province, in what was previously known as the 
Eastern Transvaal.4 The choice of the Witbank region’s heavily mined seams as a 
case study, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, was based on 
the extent to which mining activity has contributed to long-term environmental 
damage in the region. The period of study is thus framed by the long history of 
local coal mining activity in the region. This has also served in providing insight 
to the changing views of pollution over time, as they manifested in the region.  
Responses to indications of severe coal-based pollution in the Witbank coal-
fields have contributed to growing global interest in the environmental hazards of 
coal mining. Of all fossil fuels, coal releases the most carbon dioxide emissions 
per unit of energy, posing a “further threat to global climate, already warming 
alarmingly”. 5 Despite its significant contribution to climate change, the demand 
for coal continues to grow worldwide.6 Ongoing coal production in the industrial 
‘Coal City’ has resulted in the degradation of local natural resources, including 
air, water and soil. The changing history of coal-based pollution is thus crucial in 
the post-industrial age.  
The release of carbons from fossil fuels has been recently acknowledged as the 
central cause of global warming, but this was not always the case. Over time, 
Witbank experienced different kinds of coal-based pollution. Much of it stemmed 
from the actual mining processes. Modes of production varied and relied on geo-
physical constraints such as depth of coal seam and weight of the overburden. 
Processing coal involves digging up layers of earth, blasting through rock ore, 
extracting waste and creating dumps. These processes disrupted the landscape 
and triggered off more delayed processes such as acid mine drainage and desic-
cation. Secondary implications of coal production have related to the combustion 
of coal. Myriad chemicals have been released into the atmosphere, specifically 
carbons, contributing to air pollution, and, more broadly, climate change. The 
study demonstrates how broader understanding of environmental change has 
evolved over time in line with ecological change and advances in scientific 
knowledge.  
The impact of coal mining has been severe in the region, as a result of the 
neglect of the environmental cost of coal extraction and combustion by the coal 
                                                 
4  Minutes of Emalahleni Town Council Meeting, received from the Witbank News. The Witbank district 
is known today as Emalahleni. It consists of the sprawling Witbank municipal zone, as well as smaller 
surrounding centres, including Ogies, Phola, Ga-Nala, Thubelihle and Rietspruit.  
5  Appenzeller, Tim. ‘The Coal Paradox’, National Geographic, March, 2006. 
6  Interview with Mohammed Dindar, Kwachibikulu, Mpumalanga Lakes District, June 26, 2007. 
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industry. One consequence of this neglect has been the prevalence of lung dis-
ease in the region, resulting in early calls for legislation around air pollution con-
trol. As Musemwa has pointed out, localized problems related to environmental 
degradation are often left out of the climate change debate, which constitutes the 
“macro-political and economic” side of the environmental debate; this paradigm 
has “tended to efface the micro problems through which the former have been 
poignantly manifested”.7 This work therefore charts the ways in which coal-
based pollution was first understood locally, and marks changes in these con-
ceptions as the growing visibility and physical impact of pollution was felt more 
over time. 
Historically, conceptions of pollution were based on observations of the way 
coal-related activity affected nature. These understandings shifted with the emer-
gence of related scientific data, demonstrating the relationship between coal and 
pollution of natural resources. The more scientists could explain coal and its 
properties, the clearer the process and impact of pollution became. This is re-
flected in the history of South African environmental law, generally subject to 
the constraints of scientific understanding of coal-based pollution.  
The rise of an environmental consciousness of the impact of coal mining in the 
last three decades has, in part, led to a more critical consideration of the costs of 
coal to the environment by scientific and environmental bodies, local residents, 
state officials and the coal mining industry. The development of these perspec-
tives over time has not been fully documented and explained. This study will 
address that omission.  
Literature review 
This study has drawn on existing literature which touches on ideas around coal-
based pollution. This literature review demonstrates the paucity of material on 
the way in which South African coal-based pollution has been understood over 
time. Historical works on South African coal mining, while useful, are limited 
regarding pollution. Katherine Aiken has argued that historians have been “slow 
to analyse” the way in which the “heightened interest” toward the environment 
has affected the development of environmental policy.8 The study highlights the 
value of environmental history as a way in which to speed up the analysis of 
                                                 
7  Musemwa, Muchaparara, ‘Early struggles over water: From private to public water utility in the city 
of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894-1924’, Journal of Southern African Studies 34(4), 2008, p. 881. 
8  Aiken, Katherine. G. ‘”Not long ago a smoking chimney was a sign of prosperity’: Corporate and 
community response to pollution at the Bunker Hill Smelter in Kellogg, Idaho’, Environmental 
History Review 18(2), 1994, p. 67. 
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these issues, as well as including local environments “in historical explanation”.9 
According to Carruthers, environmental history also provides a way of “returning 
the discipline to political and social relevance” by asking new questions related 
to current concerns around climate change and sustainable energy.10 This idea 
and many other perspectives were found in the literature on South African 
environmental history, and helped to formulate the conceptual framework used 
within this study. Many of these ideas were linked in South Africa’s Environ-
mental History: Cases & Comparisons, edited by Ruth Edgecombe.11 The impor-
tance of Edgecombe’s intellectual influence on this work is shaped by her 
intimate knowledge of the coal industry. Her work on the history of Hlobane 
Colliery in Natal provides a powerful case study of the pattern of economic 
development of the coal mining industry.12 This is especially valuable when 
assessing the impact of coal in Witbank and its surrounds. She provides an 
important account of the workings of the early twentieth century coal industry, 
and her work serves as a good example of how to translate technical knowledge 
into historical narrative. Phia Steyn’s assessment of environmental historio-
graphy inspired the conceptual formulation of this study.13 Jacklyn Cock’s 
critical assessment of the formation of a South African environmental movement 
and its implicit challenges was an important source of background knowledge for 
conducting field work.14 Without reference to contemporary environmental 
literature, this study would have no bedrock. Having considered the contents of 
existing material, I seek to develop further the way in which society has under-
stood environmental changes, particularly related to the mining industry.  
Literature on the history of the South African mining industry was useful in 
establishing a context for further research on the coal mining industry. This study 
has thus drawn on a considerable body of literature on the history of the South 
African gold and diamond industries. Particularly in older histories of the South 
African mining industry, the emphasis has traditionally been on discovery, pio-
neering engineering and untold riches attained through gold and diamond mining. 
                                                 
9  Carruthers, Jane. ‘Environmental history in southern Africa: An overview’, Dovers, S., Edgecombe, 
R. & B. Guest, eds, South Africa’s environmental history: Cases & comparisons, David Philip Pub-
lishers, Cape Town, 2002, p. 5. 
10  Ibid.  
11  See Dovers, S., R. Edgecombe & B. Guest, eds, South Africa’s environmental history: Cases & com-
parisons, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town, 2002. 
12  Edgecombe, R. The constancy of change: A history of Hlobane Colliery: 1898-1998, The Vryheid 
(Natal) Railway, Coal and Iron Company, Ltd, Vryheid, 1998. 
13  Steyn, P. ‘The greening of our past? An assessment of South African environmental historiography’, 
New Contree 46, November 1999. 
14  Cock, Jacklyn. ‘Connecting the red, brown and green: The environmental justice movement in South 
Africa’, a case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social 
movements in post-Apartheid South Africa, Centre for Civil Society, School of Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
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The historiographical focus of most of these works is autobiographical, depicting 
the challenges faced by the Randlords in building up the industry. Kanfer’s Last 
Empire provides a biographical history of Ernest Oppenheimer and the Anglo 
American Corporation.15 Richard Mendelsohn’s biography of Sammy Marks 
provides some context for the establishment of the coal mining industry in early 
twentieth century Transvaal, but focuses mainly on the personal and professional 
challenges faced by Marks.16 Houghton and Dagut’s published selection of ar-
chival excerpts on the South African economy provided useful, yet limited, refer-
ence to late nineteenth and early twentieth century coal figures.17 This was useful 
in conceptualizing the scale of coal production, enabling a more accurate vision 
of the economic conditions of the coal industry in the early twentieth century. 
C.H. Feinstein provides the most valuable critical analysis of South African 
economic development trends, taking into account racially determined trends of 
economic growth.18 John Lang’s exhaustive study on the South African coal 
industry was valuable in establishing a basis of understanding for the study, parti-
cularly the role of coal in economic growth.  
More recent literature on proletarianisation and the social impact of mining on 
coal workers is extensive, and it has helped make sense of the living and working 
conditions of early twentieth century migrant populations. Duncan’s assessment 
of labour conditions between 1918 and 1948 highlights the attention drawn to 
labour conditions, but makes little reference to Witbank.19 A critical assessment 
of the highly contested dynamic between mine owners and labourers is well 
addressed in Bozzoli’s edited volume, Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: 
Capitalist Penetration and Popular Responses, even though the selected studies 
found in this work provided little direct reference to coal mining and pollution.20 
One exception to this is Peter Alexander’s work on labour in Witbank which has 
provided valuable insight into the way the coal industry functioned in the first 
half of the twentieth century.21 Alexander’s study details the poor working and 
living conditions endured by African migrant workers in the Witbank coal in-
                                                 
15  Kanfer, S. The last empire, Coronet Books, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993. 
16  Mendelsohn, R. & S. Marks: ‘The uncrowned King of the Transvaal’, David Philip, Cape Town, 
1991. 
17  Houghton, H. & J. Dagut, eds, Source material on the South African economy: 1860-1970, Volume 3, 
1920-1970, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1973. 
18  Feinstein, C.H., An economic history of South Africa: Conquest, discrimination and development, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
19  Duncan, D., The mills of God: The state and African labour in South Africa: 1918-1948, Witwaters-
rand University Press, Johannesburg, 1995. 
20  Bozzoli, B., ed., Town and countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist penetration and popular response, 
Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983. 
21  Alexander, P., ‘Culture and conflicts – Witbank colliery life: 1900-1950’, Unpublished paper pre-
sented on Wednesday 14 May 2008 at the Centre for Sociological Research with the Department of 
Sociology and the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies. 
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dustry, but little attention is placed on either the appearance of coal-based pol-
lution, or responses to it.  
Some references to coal mining are to be found amidst detailed unrelated ana-
lyses which assist in establishing a general context of the coal mining industry. 
Elaine Katz’s study of silicosis on the South African gold mines provides an 
interesting parallel in popular understandings of mining, pollution and disease.22 
Literature on asbestos mining and its social health implications has provided 
useful comparative perspectives for the critical study of coal-based pollution, 
both in revealing the extent to which mining companies engaged in irresponsible 
mining practices, as well as reflecting the social impact of irreversible environ-
mental degradation. The work of Jock McCulloch highlighted the way in which 
mid-twentieth century British-based asbestos mining companies withheld exten-
sive knowledge of the carcinogenic qualities of asbestos and related dangers of 
exposure to both their employees and the general public.23 The impact of the 
mining industry in this instance raised questions about the extent to which 
Witbank experienced similar exploration and exploitation. It brought to the fore 
the question of industry liability, as well as the state’s role in the assessment, 
monitoring and amelioration of coal-based pollution. Renfrew Christie’s history 
of energy politics was very influential as a comprehensive intellectual study of 
energy in South Africa.24 It demonstrated the relevant stakeholders in the history 
of South African energy production, particularly the coal industry, and also con-
textualized the bid for coal within the broader framework of Apartheid.  
The historical analysis of coal mining and consequent pollution required an 
interdisciplinary approach, and close reference was made to the sciences of 
mining engineering, ecology, geology, and power production. This necessitated 
spending time on becoming familiar with these processes, and ample reference 
has been made to journal articles. Witcomb & Baxter’s case study of abandoned 
coal land in South Africa provided crucial technical information related to the 
specific nature of coal-based pollution.25 Perspective on the full impact of 
environmental changes induced by long-term coal mining activity was shaped by 
Limpitlaw, Aken, Lodewijks, and Viljoen’s study on post-mining rehabilitation.26 
The value of the technical reports was multi-faceted, as it was not only the facts 
                                                 
22  Katz, E., The white death: Silicosis on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines: 1886-1910, Witwatersrand 
University Press, Johannesburg, 1994. 
23  McCulloch, J., Asbestos blues: Labour, capital, physicians and the state in South Africa, James 
Currey, Oxford, 2002. 
24  Christie, R., Electricity, industry and class in South Africa, State University of New York Press, 
Albany, 1984. 
25  Witcomb, A. & B. Baxter, ‘Case study: Abandoned coal mine lands in South Africa’, Mining Environ-
mental Management, July 2000. 
26  Limpitlaw, D., M. Aken, H. Lodewijks & J. Viljoen, Post-mining rehabilitation, land use and pol-
lution at collieries in South Africa, The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, July, 2005. 
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and figures represented that facilitated the research, but also the way in which 
this knowledge was represented. It helped in understanding the actual impacts of 
coal mining, thus enabling the process of assessing historical changes in how 
pollution was conceived.  
The coals of the Witbank district (Transvaal), published in 1931 by the Col-
lieries Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, is a rare early published 
source specifically related to the Witbank coalfields.27 It provided a solid under-
standing of the geology and chemistry of the Witbank coalfield. More recent 
studies supplemented representations of coal and pollution, but most useful was 
Terence McCarthy’s paper on the ‘Conservation of the Mpumalanga Lakes 
District’, in which he predicted environmental changes which would likely be 
triggered by intensive mining activity.28 Anthony Turton’s assessment of water 
pollution, specifically the dire long-term implications of acid mine drainage, re-
inforced the need for this study, which hopes to contextualize the reality of 
mining and pollution in South Africa.29  
There remains a dearth of historical material dealing with the environmental 
implications of coal. Barbara Freese’s social history of coal examines the growth 
and impact of the coal industry within a global context, but there is little focus on 
South Africa.30 One exception is James Clarke’s Our Fragile Land: South Afri-
ca’s Environmental Crisis, published in 1974, whose work is presented in an 
accessible, non-technical style.31 While crucial in its critique of the problems 
related to pollution, Clarke’s study does not provide a critical assessment of 
conceptions around coal-based pollution. The literature review has highlighted a 
significant body of material demonstrating the many problems around coal-based 
pollution, but none address the key issues dealt with here. This study forms the 
first attempt to assess ideas revolving around the broader impact of coal-based 
pollution, and how these changed over time.  
Methodology 
Reference to published material was an important preliminary part of this pro-
cess, as described in the literature review above. It helped establish the strengths, 
gaps and silences in the field of environmental history, and specifically on the 
subject of this study. Close reference to sources of background and technical 
                                                 
27  Graham, A.C. & P.N. Lategan, The Coals of the Witbank District (Transvaal), The Transvaal Cham-
ber of Mines, Collieries Committee, 1931. 
28  McCarthy, T, B. Cairncross, J. Huizenga & A. Batchelor, ‘Conservation of the Mpumalanga Lakes 
District’, 2007, Copy received from author. 
29  See Turton, A., ‘SA water and mining policy: A study of strategies for transition management’, April 
20, 2009, received draft copy from author. 
30  Freese, B., Coal: A human history, Arrow Books, Random House, 2003. 
31  Clarke, J., Our fragile land: South Africa’s environmental crisis, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1974. 
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information opened up a range of debates around environmental concerns, paving 
the way for a clearer research focus. Additional research conducted for an 
undergraduate project on the environmental impact of asbestos mining, as well as 
participation in a research product conducted by the Centre for Sustainability in 
Mining and Industry for Asbestos Relief Trust to assess the socio-economic 
implications of long-term exposure to asbestos dust provided valuable com-
parative insight into the relationship between mining practices and pollution.32 
The range of sources included here demonstrates an attempt to apply critical 
awareness of changing ideas around coal-based pollution. The research process 
was undertaken with certain assumptions about the contents and availability of 
relevant sources. Numerous challenges were experienced, including the inability 
to access certain archival records, particularly the Chamber of Mines and Wit-
bank’s town records.  
A major source for this study was the Witbank News. Exhaustive reference 
was made to all weekly publications between 1923 and 1965, selected editions 
between 1980 and 1981, as well as weekly editions between 2000 and 2008. This 
source is imbued with a comprehensive knowledge of the town – its culture, 
politics, economy – and specifically its coal industry. The Witbank News also 
demonstrated an evolving culture of understanding the environmental implica-
tions of industrial activity stimulated before and during the Second World War to 
produce more coal and manufacture steel. Particularly interesting was the role of 
the media in the construction of knowledge related to pollution. Direct references 
to coal-based pollution did not appear until the 1940s and 1950s, when air 
pollution became a major problem for the town. The level of bias implicit in the 
perspective of the Witbank News was taken into account during the analysis of 
this source, highlighting the source as only partial representation of the local 
views, with racially determined exclusion of the experiences of thousands of 
residents in Kwa Guqa and other townships.  
A number of visits were made to the National Archives of South Africa 
(NASA) in Pretoria, where archival evidence of coal trade stretched back to the 
mid-nineteenth century. Detailed minutes, inspectors’ reports, parliamentary de-
bates, correspondence, legal documentation, amongst other primary sources pro-
vided important information on the establishment of the Witbank Colliery, and 
how it affected the town’s growth. The most useful and explicit set of archival 
material included extensive documentation around the passing of the Atmos-
pheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965, which is dealt with closely in 
                                                 
32  See Singer, M., ‘A social history of rural neglect: Mafefe in the 20th Century’, Honours Dissertation, 
Department of History, University of the Witwatersrand, 2005; The future of Penge: Prospects for 
people and the environment, Project Report and Guidelines, Final Report, Centre for Sustainability in 
Mining and Industry, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, July 2008. 
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the latter half of the book. This spoke directly to the task of evaluating changing 
conceptions of coal-based pollution. These archives were valuable, particularly 
after a frustrating attempt to access Witbank’s local municipal records, which 
proved not to predate the 1990s.  
This study relies strongly on the findings of archival research, but at its heart 
are the oral sources produced during the course of field visits to Witbank in June 
and September 2008. The interview process provided insight into contemporary 
conceptions of coal-based pollution. Respondents were selected because of their 
expertise and experience of coal-based pollution. The interviews provided rele-
vant insight for the period after the promulgation of the Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965, making it necessary to rely on archival findings. 
Interviews were held in conjunction with a number of site visits to active and 
abandoned workings, dumps, underground fires and communities throughout the 
Witbank coalfield, as well as other affected coalfields throughout Mpumalanga, 
including the Mpumalanga Lakes District. This has also included several site 
visits to asbestos, platinum and coal mining districts throughout Mpumalanga 
and Limpopo, enabling a more accurate context of pollution and its role in 
shaping the history of Witbank and South Africa. The subject of the study was 
the local environment of the Witbank coalfield. The trips were made to places of 
intensive coal-based pollution, including abandoned mines, mine dumps and sites 
of mine water pollution. These field visits were invaluable, enabling a more 
accurate vision of pollution and its role in shaping the history of Witbank and 
South Africa.  
Chapter outline 
This study depicts the shaping of ideas around coal-based pollution, relying 
heavily on the interplay of theme and chronology. Each chapter focuses on how 
different manifestations of pollution were received by the South African state, the 
industry and civil sector. The chapters are linked to the central question of the 
study by their exploration of specific environmental impacts that affected the 
Witbank district over time. Witbank’s pollution did not relate to any specific part 
of the process of coal mining, and this needed to be reflected both in the structure 
of the argument and the content of the narrative. The nexus of chronology and 
thematic structure has reflected the evolving nature of pollution itself, con-
siderably influenced by the way in which coal-based pollution was understood.  
The first chapter explores the initial period of coal mining in Witbank. It fo-
cuses on early understandings around coal-based pollution by tracing the history 
of the local industry, town and surrounding areas. The introductory chapter 
depicts the limitations of early conceptions of coal mining, and demonstrates 
how physical evidence of environmental changes, specifically as a result of coal 
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mining, was ignored. Reference is made to evidence of early twentieth century 
legislation related to the prevention and control of pollution. By the 1930s, de-
mand for Witbank coal grew, with infrastructural development and capital invest-
ment making it possible for the local industry to expand dramatically. This also 
had the effect of setting in motion long-term processes of environmental degrad-
ation.  
The second chapter assesses understanding of coal-based pollution in light of 
processes of industrial transformation set in motion by the Second World War. 
The period between 1930 and 1947 is conceived as an ecological-economic 
turning point for Witbank coal. The chapter thus depicts the process of change 
leading to the significant changes in perceptions realized during this time. Post-
war reconstruction involved a committee of inquiry into the nature of pollution, 
yielding findings which profoundly changed the way in which the environmental 
repercussions of the war were seen. This was significant in the politicization of 
issues related to pollution. Reference is made to State findings about the environ-
mental impact of industry and mining, demonstrating how few measures were 
taken to monitor and prevent pollution. This was not a priority, particularly dur-
ing the war, when pressure was placed upon the South African state and industry 
to increase coal production for the war effort.  
The process leading to the promulgation of South Africa’s first major environ-
mental law, the APPA, is addressed in the third chapter. This involved significant 
research and analysis of coal-based pollution. A scheduled list of industrial 
pollutants was compiled for the APPA, with coal listed as a chief polluter. This 
meant that the coal industry was now subject to inspection and monitoring. The 
Act also expected the coal industry to introduce internal pollution monitoring 
devices. This dramatically changed the way in which the coal industry func-
tioned. The chapter also provides an overview of responses to air pollution in 
Witbank, from early records of the appearance of air pollution, to community 
mobilization against the smoke emissions of local industries such as the Highveld 
Steel and Vanadium Company. The APPA was significant in setting a new legal 
precedent around coal-based pollution, forcing State and industry to pay more 
attention to pollution control measures.  
The implications of South Africa’s first major environmental legislation are 
addressed in this final chapter. The fourth chapter begins with the implement-
ation of the APPA, demonstrating a considerable shift in the way pollution was 
understood and addressed by the South African state and coal industry. It pro-
vides an assessment of the relative efficiency of measures taken to implement the 
APPA, reflecting the increased awareness of the implications of coal-based pol-
lution. It describes the period between the introduction of the APPA and the 
exponential growth of industry with the introduction of large-scale modes of 
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opencast production by the late 1970s. As evidence of pollution was observed 
over time, more attention was drawn to the relative uncertainty of its full impact, 
but this did little to change the tide of unforeseen growth that transformed Wit-
bank and its coal industry by the late 1970s. Responses of government, industry 
and civil society stakeholders to new protective legislation such as the APPA and 
the amended Water Act of 1966 reflected new conceptions of pollution and high-
lighted the need for new ways of monitoring pollution.  
 
 
  
2 
‘Undermining’ the land:  
A history of coal mining and  
environmental changes in the  
Witbank Coalfield, 1838-1930 
Introduction 
… it’s an underground mine, and (at) any time they are afraid that it can sink.1 (My italics) 
Understanding the gravity of coal-based pollution involves exploring the envir-
onmental legacy of Witbank’s coal-based economy. This chapter explores the 
early conceptions around coal-based pollution by tracing the history of the local 
industry, town and surrounding areas. Coal-related pollution is widespread in this 
region, but the full intensity of ecological degradation in areas where mining has 
taken place in the Witbank coalfield has taken almost a century to be fully felt. 
This has resulted in long-term ecological damage throughout the district.  
The ability of the environment to withstand long-term pollution has delayed 
reactions of the environment to changes set in motion by intensive coal mining 
and power production activity. Without visible evidence of pollution, the capa-
city of intensive mining activity to pollute was historically not known. Concep-
tions of coal and pollution were thus based on contemporary notions of industrial 
growth and urban development. This involved a tacit acceptance of the changing 
face of the local environment and its influence over the spatial planning of the 
new coal town.  
                                                 
1  Interview with Isaac Mampane, Witbank, June 2, 2008. 
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The Witbank coalfield: A geological account 
… if coal were not so plentiful one could imagine it lovingly displayed in museums.2  
Within the Witbank coalfields there are five known coal seams, horizontally 
formed, and labelled No. 1 to No. 5 from the deepest to the shallowest. Other 
than the No. 3 seam, which is too thin to be of any commercial value, all seams 
have been worked. The main seam is No. 2, whose thickness rarely exceeds 120 
metres. While the coal is not always of a high quality, it has carried “consistent 
high values over large areas”.3 Although partially workable, the other three 
seams have either been denuded or present greater difficulties in mining. Thou-
sands of boreholes have been sunk over the years to prospect the underlying 
seams.4  
The coalfields are contained beneath the expansive grasslands and ancient 
rocky outcrops of South Africa’s Mpumalanga province, in what was previously 
known as the Eastern Transvaal. These are arguably the most important coal-
fields in South Africa, and have provided billions of tons of coal for energy 
production over the past century. The relatively unfaulted seams extend over a 
distance of 180 kilometres from Brakpan in the west to Belfast in the east, with a 
north-south width of approximately 40 kilometres.5 They are contained within a 
much larger series of sandstone, shale and grit layers known as the Karoo 
System, which runs beneath the Western Cape, the Free State, northern Kwazulu-
Natal and Mpumalanga.6 A 1931 geological survey argued that in the Witbank 
coalfields “alone (were) found the coal measures … of any economic importance 
to South Africa”.7 The success of these coalfields was also based on their prox-
imity to the Witwatersrand, the locus of gold mining in the Union of South 
Africa during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The coal from 
these fields was bituminous, easily combustible, and worked well for energy pro-
duction to support sustained economic activity in the region.  
The way coal was formed had become common knowledge by the 1930s, but 
during the late nineteenth century, the cause of high carbon content in coal was 
largely unexplored. The capacity for coal to burn, and even to sustain com-
                                                 
2  Freese, B., Coal: A human history, p. 3. 
3  Graham, A.C. & P.N. Lategan. The coals of the Witbank District (Transvaal), The Transvaal Chamber 
of Mines, Collieries Committee, 1931, p. 11. 
4  Ibid.  
5  Smith, D.A.M. & R.L.G. Whittaker, ‘The Springs-Witbank Coalfields’, in: C.R. Anhaeusser & S. 
Maske, eds, Mineral deposits of South Africa, p. 1969. Geological Society of South Africa, Johannes-
burg, 1986. 
6  Graham, A.C., p. 1. 
7  ‘Coal and other fuels’, in: P.A. Wagner & L. Reinecke, eds, Mineral deposits of the Union of South 
Africa, p. 233. Third (Triennial) Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 1931. 
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bustion, reflected the unique nature of its composition. Understanding of coal 
was based more on observation than scientific knowledge.  
Witbank coal became the subject of early scientific inquiry when large-scale 
gold mining in Johannesburg stimulated interest in the “microscopic examina-
tion” of particular coal samples.8 Coal came to be understood as a volatile 
organic substance, formed from the fossilized vegetation of prehistoric forests. 
The high carbon content of coal was the result of photosynthesis by ancient 
vegetation, stored and concentrated over millions of years. The rising impetus for 
coal research was driven, for the most part, by the energy requirements of the 
gold industry. 
Settlement and mining in Witbank, 1838-1906 
The areas now being mined must have been inhabited by wild animals … reports have it that, 
in the very early days, elephants and lions roamed the countryside.9 
The modern discovery of coal in the Witbank district was precipitated by the 
relatively shallow nature of seams. Numerous coal outcroppings appeared along 
hillsides and in the beds of streams.10 Written historical accounts of South 
African coal mining date back to as early as 1838. There is evidence, discovered 
through early twentieth century surveys, recording signs of pre-historic extract-
ion. Slag heaps discovered alongside outcroppings suggested that coal was used 
by indigenous hunter gatherers or Late Iron Age groups to heat furnaces for 
smelting iron ore into workable tools and weapons. Extraction was limited to 
seams of black coal running to the surface of rocky outcrops. Before the estab-
lishment of the local coal industry, the most popular land activity in the rural 
Witbank district was agriculture, including maize and corn.  
The first recorded coal sale in the Transvaal dates back to the Natal colony in 
1842. This coal was mined and transported by wagon to markets in Pietermaritz-
burg. By the 1850s, prospectors had gravitated to the Highveld, following reports 
of “considerable quantities” of coal in the Middelburg district.11 By 1868, Trans-
vaal coal was described by the explorer, Thomas Baines, as looking “tolerably 
well – black, with a moderate gloss, and clean fracture”.12  
On one of his treks from the Transvaal to Natal in 1872, Baines witnessed 
shallow digging on the farm of Daniel Kruyger, situated along the banks of the 
                                                 
8  ‘Witbank Coalfields’, Witbank News, August 18, 1933. 
9  Witbank News, October 16, 1981. 
10  ‘The stored wealth of the Transvaal: History & progress of mining – Mr James McPhee’s Address to 
the Metallurgical Congress’, Witbank News, May 8, 1930, p. 4. 
11  Lecture, Mr. E. Soar, Witbank News, 1930, p. 6.  
12  Civil engineer Thomas Baines is remembered as the “artist who in his spare time became the father of 
South African geology”. See ‘Electrical Engineers Visit Witbank’, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 
5. 
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Steenkoolspruit. Despite ready access to water, energy resources were scarce. 
Baines reported that “the family was using coal as its only fuel”.13 This fossil fuel 
was cheap, readily available – and a useful alternative to dried dung or firewood. 
He empathized with Kruyger, referring to the “bleak heights” of the area as being 
“so absolutely destitute of wood” that Baines had servants collect “cakes of 
partially dried cattle dung” that they found along the road to use for fires to cook 
their meals and “keep them warm at night”.14 Another traveller compared the 
local coal’s quality to that “known in Lancashire as the ‘Arley Main’”.15 While 
comparisons to the British coal seams were made, there is little to indicate that 
the expansion of trade markets was seen as a possibility in the Transvaal.  
Local trade, where it existed, was small-scale and subsistence-oriented. First-
hand accounts reported that wagons were backed into coal seams nine metres 
thick. The wagons were loaded with high grade coal with “the same ease that a 
wagon might be filled with rock from an ordinary mountain”.16 This coal would 
be transported and sold to the dispersed rural community for approximately 
fifteen shillings per ton.  
The first few mines in the Middelburg District included the Crown Douglas 
and Maggies Mine.17 The Brugspruit Mine was named after one of the tributaries 
of the Olifants River system, a particularly sensitive water system which encom-
passed the area in a catchment of heavy industrial and mining use.18 Early small-
scale coal mining targeted adits, or shallow horizontal shafts, where blasting and 
coal extraction was most simple. Once these seams were exploited it became 
more difficult to mine, as the majority of the coal was located beneath a thick 
layer of solid rock and earth, and required vertical shafts which went under-
ground, through layers of rock. Shafts such as these had been used from as early 
as 1908, with relatively shallow coal faces being mined from underground.  
The most popular method of underground mining in the Witbank coalfields 
was known commonly as ‘pillar and bord’ mining.19 According to a 1918 Glos-
sary of Certain Words Used in Collieries, this was the “usual way of working a 
South African colliery, in which two series of parallel excavations were made at 
right angles to each other, and by which approximately three quarters of the coal 
(was) extracted and one quarter left standing in rectangular pillars to support the 
                                                 
13  Ibid.  
14  ‘Electrical engineers visit Witbank’, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 5. 
15  Duncan Campbell Francis Moodie, quoted in article. Ibid.  
16  Ibid. 
17  Lecture, Mr. E. Soar, p. 6. 
18  Asmal, Kader, ‘Speech by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Member of Parliament at the 
official opening of the Brugspruit Water Pollution Control Works as well as the official launch of 
Water Week 1997’, Witbank, March 17, 1997. 
19  This method was also known as ‘pillar and stall’. 
17 
  
roof”.20 Following initial extraction, workings were usually sealed off and aban-
doned.  
The popularization of the pillar and bord method of underground mining was 
an economic windfall for the region. It increased local coal production enough to 
make it able to compete with other industries in the Cape and Natal. Still, efforts 
to expand coal markets were held back by numerous obstacles. The first involved 
finding high quality coal that would suit markets. Before contracts could be 
negotiated, coal properties had to be tested. Methods used to test the coal were 
rudimentary and generally relied on assessments based on visual results – reflect-
ing limited scientific knowledge and understanding of coal and its properties. 
This was evident in a number of tests done in 1902, where several Transvaal coal 
“specimens” were tested for the naval and railway markets.21 An engineer officer 
of the British naval ship ‘H.M.S. Thrush’ compared two samples by burning 
them simultaneously. Placing the samples on the front of a fire, he observed that 
they would ignite and then crumble rapidly, “giving a fierce heat for a short 
period”.22 After receiving two firings in the front the coal would then be spread 
throughout the furnace. An iron pricker would be used to prod the coal, spreading 
ash. Hard, burnt pieces, known as “clinker”, were “easily broken” by the fire 
iron, so that they collected with the ash through the bars.23 High quantities of ash 
and clinker were signs of poor quality. Another measure of quality was calorific 
content – established through units of water turned into steam by a single unit of 
coal.24 Calorific content requirements depended on the specific needs of con-
sumers, resulting in considerable insecurity for prospective Transvaal colliers.25  
A second obstacle in the development of the Witbank coal industry was the 
lack of adequate transport infrastructure. This began to change in 1895 with the 
construction of a railway from Pretoria to the port of Lourenço Marques along 
Delagoa Bay in Portuguese East Africa.26 The establishment of the Witbank 
station sped up industrial development. As the cost of transport decreased, Wit-
                                                 
20  National Archives of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as NASA), Government Native Labour 
Bureau, 1904-1950 (GNLB) 304/427/18, ‘Glossary of Certain Words Used in Collieries and Mention-
ed in this Report’, December 18, 1918. 
21  NASA, Governor of the Transvaal (GOV) 588/PS/290/01 Ibid. Report on Two Specimens of Trans-
vaal Coal, Trials of Transvaal Coal for Use on British Ships, by R. Hingston, Engineer Officer of 
H.M.S. Thrush, August 9, 1902. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Calories are commonly used to derive the energy content of carbon, such that when combustion takes 
place, the energy that is released may be measured in units. A 1933 study defined calorific value as 
the measurement “in units that refer to the number of pounds of water that can be transformed into 
steam by a pound of the special coal in question” See Witbank News, August 18, 1933, p. 3. 
25  Naval and railway markets demanded high quality coal, but use for poorer quality coal, or ‘duff’ coal, 
would arise over time. 
26  Jewish Life in the South African Country Communities, Vol. 1, SA friends of Beth Hatefutsoth, Johan-
nesburg, 2002, p. 102. 
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bank coal was absorbed into the bunker trade. Transvaal coal was now more 
easily marketable to international trade networks. Early commercial trade of coal 
between the Transvaal-based coal companies relied on varied export markets and 
public tenders. Standard practices indicated specifications for coal composition, 
including size, presence of rock, shale or foreign matter.27 The chemical proper-
ties of coal were an important consideration for consumers, particularly sulphur 
content, which could not be removed from the coal through existing methods.28 
The organic sulphur content, infused “fairly uniformly”29 through chemical bond 
with hydrocarbons in the coal, was often too high to meet export standards. With 
time, and rapid industrial advances, larger chunks of coal referred to as ‘nuts’ or 
‘peas’ were sold. Profits were still curtailed by the rejection of enormous 
amounts at the pithead. Quality of coal was only determined once it was brought 
to the surface, resulting in the dumping of large quantities of rejected coal. 
Colliery dumps of this time “rivalled those of the gold mines”, permanently alter-
ing the landscape of the rapidly transforming district.30  
The South African war temporarily halted the growth of the new coal industry. 
Post-war figures by 1902 were a mere quarter of 1898 figures of approximately 
two million tons, but the industry recovered quickly. Early twentieth century 
fortune seekers flocked into the district. When it became clear that the elusive 
gold seams simply did not exist, many prospectors turned to coal. This seemed a 
secure investment; the Highveld plains provided ample and affordable coal-
bearing ground. Thick, shallow and unfaulted seams, coupled with cheap labour, 
meant that coal could be cheaply mined.31  
By the turn of the century, production of coal had slightly increased. The 
urban settlement began to grow with “about 60 or 70 people (who) had built their 
homes – very haphazardly – around the original hostelry”.32 The shanty town 
came to be known as Witbank – ‘wit’ referring to the characteristic white sand-
stone outcroppings of the district.33 The township of Witbank was established in 
1903 by Samuel Stanford, who had originally arrived in the Middelburg district 
as a trader in the 1880s. He spent time setting up a trading store near the farm, 
Zeraatsfontein, and surveying it for coal. The farm owner, Jacob Taljaard, let 
                                                 
27  11.19 Kilojoules per kilogram (kJ/kg) was the average calorific value of bituminous coal in Witbank, 
but 12.5 Kilojoules per kilogram was the minimum accepted value for railway or naval use, posing 
early challenges to the marketing of Witbank coal. 
28  NASA, Colonial treasurer (1900 - 1910) (CT) 150/T33/441 ‘Miscellaneous: Supply of Coal to Mauri-
tius’, Mauritius Government Gazette, No 1, January 4, 1909. 
29  Camm, A., ‘Sulphur in coal and its removal’, Mining Engineer 151(361), October 1991, Institute of 
Mining Engineers, p. 118. 
30   ‘Miscellaneous’, Mauritius Government Gazette, No 1. 
31  Mendelsohn, R., Sammy Marks, p. 119. 
32  Ibid.  
33  ‘Farming – In Witbank’, Witbank News, November 20, 1931. 
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Stanford survey the farm property, where he found a thick seam of coal. The 
existence of coal in the district was “anything but a secret” but Stanford was the 
first to “enlarge the scale of mining from the mere picking up of stray pieces to 
systematic exploitation”.34 
Through investment from the Neumann Group, Stanford founded the Witbank 
Colliery. Soon after, the town was laid out in 1903, within relatively close 
proximity of the numerous workings. While the Witbank Colliery exerted an 
inordinate influence over the new settlement, colliery management showed little 
consideration for the adverse effects of the underground mining within the town 
boundaries. In July 1904, Mr. Tamplin-Lewis, acting manager of the colliery, 
made an application to the Office of the Commissioner of Mines in Johannesburg 
to “obtain permission to carry on ordinary Mining operations under the proposed 
Township of Witbank”.35 Even with little official regulation over mining prac-
tices during this time, this application was rejected. The Government Mining 
Engineer argued that  
in view of the shallow depth at which mining is carried on at Witbank it is considered … that 
subsidences of the surface (would) sooner or later take place which would endanger the 
safety of the persons residing in a township built over such workings.36  
H.W. Smith, Secretary to the Mines Department, argued that under Article 2, 
Section 2, of the Mines and Works Regulations, mining “beneath the township in 
question should be prohibited”.37 Tamplin-Lewis’s application was rejected on 
the basis that mining under a built environment – namely, the town of Witbank – 
could compromise the structural integrity of roads and buildings in the town, 
which would then become prone to subsidence. This would endanger residents of 
the town. This legal exchange reflects caution about the inherent dangers of 
underground mining. The environmental risk to the town’s future was recog-
nized, but only insofar as it threatened potential future capital investment. 
Mining remained a staple economic activity in the region – eclipsing alter-
native land uses – especially agriculture. This is illustrated in the case between 
the Witbank Colliery and Daniel Jacobus Malan, a local Witbank farmer. In 
November, 1904, Malan appeared at the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme 
Court of the Transvaal. The plaintiff, Witbank Colliery, had concerns over the 
terms of their contract with Malan, who had ceded the mineral rights to his farm 
                                                 
34  ‘Electrical engineers visit Witbank’, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 5. 
35  NASA, Secretary to the Law Department, 1900-1925 (LD) 380/AG 1323/03, Letter from H.W. Smith, 
Secretary to the Mines Department, to Office of the Commissioner of Mines, Johannesburg, July 9, 
1904. 
36  Ibid.  
37  Ibid.  
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‘Blesboklaagte’ in 1898, “without restriction and in perpetuity”,38 while coal 
operations were still taking place on the adjoining farm. In the interim, Malan 
had constructed several buildings upon his land, violating the terms of his con-
tract. As a result, the Mining Department, “acting under their duly promulgated 
Mining Regulations”, refused to allow the Witbank Colliery to continue mining 
operations under the buildings which Malan had constructed.39 The plaintiff thus 
argued that the farmer had interfered with their “Mining Rights”. This particular-
ly related to a clause granting the Witbank Colliery  
the right to sufficient ground for the sinking of shafts and wells, the making of excavation 
and other facilities … together with a piece of ground sufficient for a siding on the railway 
… ‘minerals and mineral rights’ (would) include and comprehend the right to mine, dig and 
win gold, silver, diamonds, coal and other minerals and metals of what nature so ever.40  
Was Malan even aware of the permanent changes to his agricultural land? 
Without his testimony, this is impossible to prove. The nature of his contract with 
the Witbank Colliery revealed early industry knowledge of the immediate envir-
onmental impacts of coal mining. It serves as historic evidence of the accepted 
fact that building construction could affect, or restrict, mining operations. It also 
revealed some indication of preferential treatment of mining over agriculture as a 
national economic activity.  
Finally, Malan’s case reflects the environmental challenges encountered by 
companies in mining the Witbank coalfields. The industry had begun to cultivate 
economic growth for the local district far more effectively than local agricultural 
markets. The distinction between town growth and industry growth was thus 
often blurred; this had the result of compromising legal decision making pro-
cesses around continued mining in a rapidly developing regional centre. 
Environment and labour: Twin costs of coal mining in Witbank, 
1906-1920 
With intensified industrial transformation throughout the Transvaal, the ‘coal 
city’ of Witbank rapidly emerged. An assessment of the town’s development 
provides remarkable insight into the way energy was produced and consumed in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. In 1907 the Transvaal Coal 
Owners’ Association (TCOA) further formalized the emerging coal industry. In 
the same year, an economic study conducted on the effect of power supply 
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schemes in the Transvaal revealed far-reaching obstacles in the process of energy 
production, particularly how difficult it was for the coal industry to make ends 
meet. The study showed that the railways benefited more from transporting the 
heavy cargo than the colliery owners of the pits benefited from the sale of coal, 
especially “when one (took) into account the sale price of the product at the pit 
head, as compared with the heavy rate per ton … for its conveyance to the 
market”.41 The irregular supply and availability of railway trucks used to trans-
port coal to markets also held back production, frustrating Witbank’s colliery 
managers.  
According to P. Dickson, manager of the Coronation Colliery in 1911, halting 
the steady output of coal had ripple effects felt throughout the industry. Accord-
ing to his estimate, being “idle” for 38 hours during July, 1911 had  
represented a loss of about 3,500 tons … and 30 hours during August which gave … a drop 
of over 3,000 tons … these shortages had to be made up by overtime. Assuming that the 
other collieries in this district lost to the same amount in proportion to their allotment, this 
would mean, without overtime, a loss of about 35,000 tons per month, approximately. The 
result would mean the closing of several of the gold mines for a few days … if the ad-
ministration could supply trucks regularly as requisitioned for, it would be a great relief to 
the various colliery managers.42 
In many cases, the burden of intermittent stoppages of coal loading fell upon 
the labourers, whose long hours were often extended into overtime in order to 
minimize the loss of productivity caused by lack of available transportation. The 
medical officer of the Coronation Colliery had argued that the high number of 
labourers being admitted for medical attention was directly related to the 
“amount of overtime worked”,43 but that it was “difficult to avoid this”44 because 
of the need for continued output of coal to meet contractual agreements with 
consumers when trucks were available.45  
Colliery owners were obliged to maintain strong relations with the South Afri-
can Railways. In a 1907 letter to the prime minister of the Transvaal, the secre-
tary of one company recognized the  
... importance of the Railways as consumers at any rate assisting and encouraging within all 
reasonable limits the Coal Mines and Coal Industries of the two Colonies concerned.46  
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Each colliery had to enter into a ‘Private Sidings Agreement’ in order to be 
able to construct railway sidings at the station.47 Without this, they would be cut 
off from the loading stations where bunker coal was loaded to be transported to 
the coast. In addition, there was consensus amongst local colliery owners that the 
“shortsighted policy of imposing railway rates (on the coal industry) … (had) 
successfully stifled any hope of … building up or even maintaining the bunker 
trade”. 48 
Despite restrictions, coal output in the Transvaal grew exponentially during 
this period. 2,345,427 tons of coal were sold in 1910. The Power Act was pro-
mulgated in 1910, and under Section 27 the prime minister was given authority 
to grant licenses for the supply of local municipal power. Market expansion thus 
rested largely on the electrification of the town of Witbank itself.  
By 1918, the Witbank Colliery was granted permission by the Governor-
General-in-Council to supply “electric current for lighting purposes” to the com-
pound of Witwatersrand Native Labour Association situated on the farm Bles-
boklaagte, previously owned by Daniel Jacobus Malan.49 By 1920, permission 
had been granted by the Minister of Mines under Section 27 for the Witbank 
Colliery to supply electric current to the municipality of Witbank “for lighting 
and other purposes”.50 By 1921 the annual output of the Witbank coalfield had 
increased to 6,947,362 tons.51.  
Prior to the establishment of the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) in 
1922, the Witbank Colliery provided power generation through its ‘Main Gene-
rating Station’.52 The Witbank Power Station was built by Escom in 1926, but 
was staffed and operated by the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company.53 
At the time of its construction, the Witbank Power Station was the largest in the 
Southern Hemisphere, stripped of its title only with the later construction of the 
Klip Power Station in Vereeniging. It represented a revolution not only in the 
way coal was marketed, but fundamentally in the methods used to produce 
energy. The Witbank scheme would serve as an example to other towns of how  
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Photo 2.1 The regional offices of the Electricity Supply Commission in Witbank 
(Witbank News Collection, undated, c. 1933) 
 
 
light and power should be supplied.54 A newly electrified Witbank would be 
marketed as a model town in an attempt to draw the attention of industrialists, 
representing “a landmark in the history of electricity in this country”.55  
Electricity was an amenity not extended to the hostels that housed the local 
migrant labour force. Those residing in the local hostels worked for some of the 
largest collieries in the district, including the Transvaal & Delagoa Bay, Cassel 
Coal Company and Witbank Colliery.  
Living conditions were generally poor. The cramped conditions in compounds 
were made worse by poor sanitation and diet; the proximity of compounds to 
mining activity further exacerbated public health conditions. Underground condi-
tions were restricted by the environmental constraints of the labour intensive 
pillar and bord method. Workers were thus exposed to a number of impacts of 
coal-based pollution in both occupational and living environments, including 
smoke, dust and chemical fumes.  
Consisting mostly of migrant workers from rural South African districts, as 
well as seasonal workers from across the national borders, the African workforce 
existed in a “state of drudging toil, and wearing poverty”.56 The poor living and 
working conditions, exposure to coal-based pollution and general lack of rights 
and long hours was considered by the secretary of the regional Industrial and 
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Commercial Union to be a “horrible state of affairs … contrary to justice”.57 The 
message of this ‘dissident’ voice was largely silenced by the pressure placed on 
managers to push workers to produce more and more coal in line with growing 
markets.  
 
 
 
Photo 2.2 Gang of coalminers, c. 1930s. 
This undated, unlabelled photograph, found in the collection of the Witbank 
News, depicts a gang of coal miners in the early years of Witbank’s coal mining 
industry. The notable inclusion of children amongst the visibly impoverished 
group highlights the role of child labour on the coal mines.  
(Witbank News Collection, c. 1930s) 
 
 
The “unhealthy state of the coal mines” did not affect only African workers. 
Despite the fact that white mine workers, mostly British or European skilled 
miners deployed by companies to the region, earned up to nine times as much as 
the average African worker, this placed them at no lesser risk to occupational 
exposure. If miners complained, they would generally “get the sack”.58  
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Regulations around working hours were outlined in the Mines and Works Act 
of 1911, but this did little to improve overall conditions. The causal relationship 
between coal-based pollution and poor general health amongst coal workers was 
also poorly defined; Herbert Payne, a local Inspector for Native Affairs in 
Witbank complained to the Native Affairs Department in 1912 that workers were 
“overdriven”, given little time to “wash themselves and to sleep”.59 Most 
collieries in the district still maintained twelve hour shifts. Besides, the imple-
mentation of the regulations defined by the Mines and Works Act of 1911 was 
obstructed by the need to fulfil orders. Another factor was the high demand for 
workers, and their ability to move from one colliery to another. Short-term con-
tracts made it more difficult to assess long-term health implications of intensive 
exposure to coal-based pollution, including the ingestion of coal dust, the effects 
of chemical exposure, as well as higher prevalence of tuberculosis and silicosis. 
By 1912, tuberculosis had become a major health problem in the region, and a 
Tuberculosis Commission was appointed to examine conditions.60 Colliery own-
ers generally avoided taking care of the sick, and workers affected by tuber-
culosis were generally “repatriated”.61 Living conditions in the compounds did 
not improve.  
A visit by the regional Medical Officer in November, 1916, revealed that the 
residences attached to the Witbank Colliery were in many ways “defective and 
contrary to the Regulations”. One response to the poor conditions in compounds, 
as well as the growing pollution problem, was the emergence of an off-mine 
African community in locations on the verges of the urban settlement.  
The theory and practice of environmental legislation 
Early twentieth century legislation recognized coal mining and combustion as a 
chief pollutant. In fact, the problem was not restricted to a lack of legislation; it 
also extended to the lack of enforcement of existing regulations. Legislation that 
complicated or obstructed the advancement of profit within the coal industry was 
conveniently sidelined.  
This section interrogates some of this legislation, particularly in relation to the 
production of pollution, with the aim of establishing legal conceptions of coal-
based pollution during the early decades of the twentieth century.  
The most immediately felt form of pollution related to coal mining involved 
the displacement of the earth – however, this was not understood in terms of 
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pollution, but rather in terms of financial convenience. The risk of pillar collapse, 
with concomitant outbreak of uncontrollable underground fires, was a constant 
threat to colliery owners. In 1906 the Witbank Colliery’s Secretary, H.G.L. Pan-
chaud had written to the Acting Government Mining Engineer in Johannesburg 
because of a controversy between them and their neighbouring colliery. The 
Landau Colliery had requested the reduction of pillars bordering the two separate 
workings.  
Panchaud was opposed to this – he even described it as posing a significant 
threat for the Witbank Colliery. This referred to the risk of pillar collapse as a 
result of weakened integrity of the pillars. He also recognized that  
in a coal mine there (was) always more or less danger of an outbreak of fire and that in case 
of such an outbreak a 30` pillar would probably not be sufficiently thick to prevent the 
spread of the fire from one colliery to another, whereas the 100` pillar might keep such a fire 
from spreading.62 
Industry officials recognized the risk of underground fires breaking out, but 
there was little knowledge of how to control them, and the conception that a 30` 
pillar was not ‘sufficiently thick,’ as opposed to a 100` pillar, was intuitive rather 
than scientific. Another “objection” involved waste water “percolating through 
… from a neighbouring mine in which mining and pumping operations” had 
been suspended.63 With no joint application between the competing collieries, the 
discretion fell upon the Government Mining Engineer, who referred to the Crown 
Law under Regulation 17.  
Panchaud, speaking on behalf of the colliery’s Board of Directors, had argued 
that if the Cassel Coal Company was granted permission to reduce the boundary 
pillars on their side, their own potential output capacity would be reduced as they 
“would consider it their duty to leave on this Company’s side of the boundary, a 
pillar of 85 feet, which would mean sacrificing by this Company of 35` of coal 
through out the length of their boundary”.64 While the Witbank Colliery reflected 
some concern over determining the precise boundary pillars, these concerns were 
based primarily on economic expedience. The collapse of an underground mine 
ceiling as a result of compromised pillars would have amounted to an enormous 
loss for the company. Water ‘percolating’ into the mine was not understood in 
terms of the potential build-up of acid mine drainage, but rather as an added cost 
in the production of coal for a market with extremely narrow profit margins.  
Early twentieth century archival records reflect some indication of government 
attempts to control sources of pollution. A brief examination of some of the 
earliest South African legislation has yielded evidence of consciousness of envir-
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onmental constraints by policy makers, as well as an acknowledgement of the 
role of the mining industry as a source of pollution, particularly with regard to 
water resources. Regulation 22 of the Gold Law Act (No 35) of 1908 stipulated 
that  
no holder of a water right or mining title shall allow the refuse from battery or mining plant 
to flow or fall into, pollute or make turbid the water of any stream, river or water course.65  
While this legislation may have taken into account the potential of mining to 
pollute, revealing a very specific knowledge and conception of the environmental 
impact of industry, including coal mining, it did not specify how this could be 
prevented. Regulation 7 (Part 1 and 2) of the Mines and Works Regulations Act 
(No 12) of 1911 attempted to deal with the fact that pollution of water sources 
was happening, in an attempt to control the extent of the problem. Under no 
circumstances was it acceptable for polluted water to “escape without having 
been previously rendered innocuous”.66 The Act went on to define measures 
which should be taken to prevent consumption of polluted water, including fen-
cing off contaminated sites to prevent “inadvertent access”, as well as posting 
notice boards “in suitable places to warn persons from making use of such 
water”.67  
There are clear indications in the early legislation that it was understood that 
coal mining contributed to the pollution of water and land sources, adversely 
affecting surface land activities such as irrigation. A stipulation in the Irrigation 
and Conservation of Waters Act No. 8 of 1912 also clearly reflected the extent to 
which the state prioritized mining. Section 137 of this act appeased mining in-
dustry officials by asserting that “nothing contained in this Act shall be construed 
as derogating from any powers or jurisdiction conferred upon the Minister of 
Mines or any Mining Commissioner by any law relating to mining for precious 
or base metals”.68 The jurisdiction of the Witbank coal industry was thus pro-
tected by the state, often compromising alternate sources of land-based economic 
output such as irrigation for agriculture.  
In 1921 this Act was amended, citing coal mining and washing as a significant 
contributor towards the creation of waste water contaminating rivers and streams. 
As industrialization in the Transvaal progressed, there was a growing recognition 
of “the large number of industrial processes in which problems of treatment and 
disposal of polluting waste waters have to be considered, if river and stream 
pollution is to be avoided”.69 The legal conception of industry-based pollution 
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thus reflects considerable appreciation of environmental risks of mining, but did 
little to disseminate standardized practices for local authorities to utilize in the 
prevention or remedy of these inevitable impacts. This can also be seen in 
government’s response to growing complaints of water pollution in Section III of 
the Public Health Act (No 36) of 1919, where the responsibility of water resource 
management was placed upon local authorities  
for preventing the pollution so as not to endanger health of any supply of water which the 
public within its district, has a right to use and does use for drinking purposes (whether such 
supply is derived from sources within or beyond its district) … and for purifying any such 
supply which has become so polluted, and to take measures (including, if necessary, 
proceedings at law) against any person so polluting any such supply or polluting any stream 
so as to be a nuisance to health.70  
Witbank had been declared a local municipality in 1914, through significant 
financial support from the Witbank Colliery. For the first decade of its existence, 
the Witbank Colliery had, in effect, served as the local authority for the town. 
Hence, a very deeply entrenched conflict of interest may be cited as a hindrance 
for the effective implementation of the Public Health Act in Witbank. This was 
also constrained by a limited comprehension of the extent to which coal mining 
actually polluted local natural resources.  
Changing conceptions of the ‘Coal City’, 1921-1933 
Following the electrification of the town, and particularly after the establishment 
of the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) in 1923, with offices in Witbank, 
the Witbank municipality began a campaign to attract further industry to the 
emerging industrial centre.71 With an average annual output of six million tons, 
the basis of this campaign was that Witbank was the ‘model’ town for Escom.72 
This resulted in the up-scaling of mining and levels of output throughout this 
decade. Local residents felt that the government had a duty to support continued 
expansion through the “extension of the lives of existing mines by a reduction in 
working costs, and the opening up of new mines”.73 In 1927, Witbank became 
the “most efficiently and adequately lit town in the Union”74 when the Mayor’s 
wife was called upon to switch on Escom’s ‘Electric Lighting System’.75 
With the rapid expansion of the gold industry, coupled with the steady growth 
of secondary industry throughout the Transvaal, the demand for electricity had 
become a matter of national priority. The Electricity Act of 1922 resulted in the 
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formation of the Electricity Supply Commission under Dr. van der Bijl in March 
the following year.76 Escom was the outcome of recognition by government of-
ficials that electricity was both “a public utility and an instrument of industry”.77 
It was not a private company, and in its creation “it was not intended to create an 
electricity supply monopoly”.78 As a public works utility, Escom would function 
at cost.79 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Escom worked according to these 
principles. This provided a sense of security to Witbank authorities, presumably 
preventing any conflict of interest between various community stakeholders.80 
Escom provided new incentive for economic growth, and the local industry was 
supported by the community, such that its establishment in the district was al-
most certain. When Escom was taxed £600 for machinery in 1927, local debate 
ensued about why this company was being treated differently to the coal com-
panies, who were not taxed, but were “engaged in what (was) practically equi-
valent to the operations of the Electricity Supply Co., that is, the wresting of 
potential power from Nature”.81 This impression of the coal industry and Escom 
reflects a common battle between industry and the natural environment to har-
ness its energy potential for economic growth. Whether or not environmental 
impacts were understood, or felt, by residents, was secondary to the perceived 
role of the coal industry, which defined Witbank’s very existence.  
The Fuel Research Act of 1925 demonstrated increased control over natural 
resources by the state by the mid-1920s. This Act made it mandatory for 
prospectors and miners to submit information to the relevant state departments; it 
thus became easier to trace the growth of the industry from this point, revealing 
key indicators of local conceptions around coal use and resultant pollution.82  
The power company claimed that all poisonous gases, “such as the deadly 
carbon monoxide”, were destroyed through the super-heated and rapid burning of 
the fuel.83 This total combustion prevented the atmosphere from becoming “un-
healthy”.84 Remaining ash and clinker from the furnaces were transported to 
dumps, while the massive amount of water used to produce steam was condensed 
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and cooled in a pond daily. These processes were cheap and convenient, and 
provided a supposedly safe way of burning coal without poisoning the atmos-
phere.  
While manual recording and later mechanical recording devices measured 
carbon dioxide levels of coal combustion, these were not seen in terms of long-
term atmospheric pollution. Claims about improved burning processes, resulting 
in the safe consumption of carbon monoxide, cannot be proven through such 
tests, neither are they likely. A lack of environmental impact assessments from 
this time reflects how pollution was generally measured at face value in the 
establishment of energy processes related to economic growth. Did a smokeless 
power station really equal safe carbon emission? Claims regarding public health 
not only reveal that industry officials acknowledged the potential public health 
(and, indirectly, environmental) implications of coal mining, but also marketed 
supposedly ‘cleaner’ processes as a means by which to placate general opinion.  
By the mid-1930s, geology, along with chemistry, had become crucial for 
industrial development. A geological study of the Witbank Coalfield was pub-
lished, entitled Coals of the Witbank District. The work was welcomed by the 
coal industry. The foreword was written by John Roy, then-Chairman of the 
Collieries Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines.85 He boasted that “the 
collieries working in this area alone (were) capable of producing all the coal 
required to fulfil the entire demands of the coal trade”.86 Thirteen active collieries 
were recorded, including the Witbank Southern Area, Witbank Central Area, 
Transvaal & Delagoa Bay, Landau, Anglo-French Navigation, Schoongezicht, 
Middelburg Steam, Douglas (Witbank), Coronation (Kromdraai), Clydesdale, 
Tweefontein & Waterpan, Minnaar and Kendal. The Witbank News published 
extracts, and readers were urged to refer to the book itself for “proofs of these 
interesting and surprising statements”.87  
Conclusion 
By the 1930s, the Witbank coal industry had grown into a significant producer of 
coal, as well as a range of other mineral and chemical products. The coal market 
developed in spite of numerous obstacles, including the absence of railways, 
truck shortages, competition and poor coal quality. The economic activity 
stimulated by the successful marketing of coal stimulated rapid urban expansion, 
as coal stimulated further growth. The environment of the Witbank coalfield was 
severely compromised in the growth of coal market. What legislation did exist 
was barely implemented, and generally placed the onus on the industry, as well 
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as the local municipal authorities, to deal with issues of pollution from industrial 
waste – with few enforcement measures implemented. After all, the local coal 
industry carried enormous political and economic leverage. Local conceptions 
towards coal mining, and its environmental implications, were strongly influ-
enced by these power structures. The jurisdiction of the Witbank coal industry 
was thus protected by the State, often compromising alternate sources of land-
based economic output. The following chapter deals with the impact of the 
Second World War as a stimulus for industrial growth and expansion of coal 
mining production, as well as the impact that this had on coal-based pollution in 
the Witbank district. 
 
 
 
Photo 2.3 Coal transport, undated. 
As the scale of production grew in Witbank, the transport of 
coal to markets became increasingly important, and challen-
ging. This image depicts a locomotor of the Witbank Colliery 
Ltd, where coal would be loaded.  
(Witbank News collection, undated) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
The effect of war: Witbank’s  
changing environment in a growing  
energy market, 1930-1947 
Introduction 
By 1930, the Witbank coal industry was a major producer of bituminous coal in 
South Africa. Over the decade, the State began to prioritize industrial expansion, 
especially immediately before and during the war years. It focused on building 
up its twin parastatals, the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), and the Iron 
and Steel Corporation (Iscor). Coal thus experienced an increase in demand, with 
significant development in mine engineering technology to yield greater quan-
tities. This chapter will assess conceptions of coal-based pollution in light of this 
industrial transformation, particularly within the context of the Second World 
War. The rapid expansion of industry stimulated more intensive forms of coal 
extraction, placing increasing pressure on available natural resources in the 
Witbank district. This chapter explores how ideas around coal-based pollution 
changed as a result of trends directly related to the war, especially the use of 
unorthodox methods of underground mining to complement coal production for 
the war effort. The contribution of the industry to the war industry was celebrated 
during this time, and little emphasis was placed on the potential environmental 
cost of intensified levels of production. Pollution was viewed as an unavoidable 
consequence of industrial development and economic growth. Worsening envir-
onmental conditions in Witbank by the end of the war rapidly changed percep-
tions of the gravity of coal-based pollution.  
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Towards a ‘different’ kind of beauty  
The continued industrial transformation of the Witbank coalfield, coupled with 
the marketing of the town for other kinds of industry, resulted in largely positive 
perspectives of coal. During the 1930s, with the steady expansion of the coal 
market Witbank gained international recognition as providing the “principal coal 
beds” in South Africa.1 Many investors now explored opportunities in the region 
with renewed interest. This included a delegation of the Third Empire Mining 
and Metallurgical Congress, which toured the region in April, 1930. The group 
was welcomed by John Roy, Governor-General of the Transvaal Coal Owners 
Association (TCOA). Roy assured the visitors and their wives that while the 
district was “possibly not (as) attractive as places previously visited”, it was 
crucial for the “development of all other industries and the requirements of man-
kind”.2 Roy made reference to the loveliness of the sunlit Transvaal highveld, 
with its variety of flora and fauna, riverbeds teaming with wildlife, and tall 
grasses swaying under an expansive blue sky. Witbank was clearly an unusual 
stopping point for the pleasure-seeking traveller – but the town had appropriated 
its industrial accoutrement as a new form of attraction. Witbank was appealing 
because of, and not in spite of, early appearances of coal-based pollution.  
Coal was seen as essential for sustained industrial transformation in the 
Witbank district. This amounted to an aesthetic re-configuration of the natural 
environment. Coal-based pollution was sublimated by the idealization of local 
environmental changes, including the increasingly common appearance of a 
smoky horizon, dotted with smoke stacks and black mountains of coal waste. In 
this sense, Witbank retained its status as an ideal location for industrial 
development, despite having “very little claim to beautiful scenery”.3 The town 
took on the qualities of “a different kind of beauty … in its dark clouds of smoke 
which (could) be seen in every direction.”4 Conceiving the haze in such a way 
was seen to be a symbol of progress – rather than the steady build-up of 
atmospheric pollution. Signs of coal-based pollution were culturally linked to 
progress and development for the region. Witbank Colliery was even featured in 
a picture postcard advertising the town. The ‘Approach to Witbank Colliery’ 
featured power lines, smoke stacks and dark smoke emissions alongside neatly 
planted wattle trees in the picture framing the pathway leading to the colliery. 
Pollution was central to this aesthetic construct, with dark, billowing fumes 
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demonstrative of the wealth of the city. Not only was pollution acknowledged as 
a distinguishing feature of the region, it was a way to market the town. This 
resulted in the idiosyncratic ideological construction of the natural landscape in 
line with the rapid industrial changes of the region.  
 
 
 
Photo 3.1 Postcard depicting ‘Approach to Witbank Colliery Co. Witbank’ 
 (Witbank News collection, undated) 
 
 
Not everyone accepted the overwhelmingly positive perception of coal 
mining. Some dissent could be seen in the pages of the Witbank News. For many, 
the place stood out not because of the “beneficial employment afforded, nor … 
because of the trade advantages”, but rather because of the “smoke nuisance”.5 
The unprecedented growth of the coal industry, coupled with the lack of state 
regulation over industrial emissions, during these decades meant that opposition 
to coal-based pollution would go unheard for decades to come. The appearance 
of severe localized evidence of coal-based pollution had a direct impact of the 
daily lives of local residents, but even “the silent curses of housewives, residents 
and visitors … must … have nearly blasted the smoke stack”.6 
                                                 
5  ‘Witbank Colliery’, Witbank News, January 21, 1927. 
6  Ibid.  
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A ‘superhuman’ battle against spontaneous combustion 
One of Witbank’s biggest headaches …7 
Witbank’s underground coal mines would regularly burst into flame. The 
appearance of fires was a significant challenge for colliery management. Once 
underground fires broke out, they were largely inextinguishable. The typical coal 
face in an early twentieth century underground mine was crudely exposed, with 
no preventive measures to ensure safety. Fine coal particles were strewn around 
the mine, and few measures were taken to ventilate the working area or wet the 
coal. This had the effect of exposing a large surface area of coal to oxidation. The 
layer of soil above the mine tended to dry out and subside, allowing “continuous 
free entry of air into the workings”.8 The high pyrite content of the coal made the 
coal more susceptible to combustion and constant self-generation.9 Flames could 
be doused, but the subterranean coals would continue to smoulder. Fires also had 
the effect of compromising the stability of the surface above the mine, with 
widespread subsidence. The fragmented surface, with “crown holes” and “deep 
tension cracks” thus allowed oxygen in, facilitating combustion.10 Once burning, 
coal could no longer be used. Land affected by underground fires was usually 
abandoned, resulting in significant financial losses for the coal company.11  
In July 1926 a fire erupted in the main shaft of the Witbank Colliery. Repre-
senting millions of pounds of losses for a company which largely controlled the 
town, a blaze in the colliery was breaking news. The fire was reported and de-
bated in both the media and company meetings. It was described as representing 
“a terrific battle … waged with the forces of nature on one hand, and really 
superhuman efforts by the mine staff and employees on the other”.12 That the 
experience of dousing the flames was analogous to a ‘battle’ reveals an unders-
tanding of the natural environment held to the coal mining industry. ‘Nature’ was 
seen as a realm to be dominated, controlled – and even defeated. Within this 
paradigm, man was elevated to a ‘superhuman’ realm, suddenly able to wage a 
‘battle’ against the ‘forces of nature’ which held him back from his objectives. 
No mention was made of the cause of the fire – and later reference to the 
underground fires would argue that although “nobody (was) quite sure as to how 
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the fires originally began, it (was) thought that they (were) a result of the old coal 
seams catching alight by spontaneous combustion”.13 
Six months later, the underground fire still smouldered. The battle to extin-
guish it was abandoned. Mining operations had to continue, and shareholders 
now focused on ways to contain the fire. The coal face was isolated “by means of 
sand and water lowered through boreholes sunk from the surface around the 
affected area”.14 The company gained some recompense through an insurance 
settlement of £30,000. Within a year, operations around the sealed off section 
continued to extract coal not affected by combustion. New shafts were sunk on 
the Central section of the Witbank coal property.15 This reflected the importance 
of continued and regular output of quality coal.  
This experience proved that while the dangers of coal mining did exist, they 
were controllable – and, besides, the need for continued mining outweighed its 
risks. This example of what could go wrong in a coal mine was soon forgotten. 
By the early 1930s, electric coal cutters and centrifugal pumps had increased the 
potential output of the workable coal seams. Owing to the relative dryness of the 
mines, these pumps were often “excessively corroded” by acidic mine water 
which would then be released into surrounding river and ground water catch-
ments.16 The colliery assured the public that even though instances of gas had 
been found in the Central area, ventilation was “(e)specially efficient”.17 Meas-
ures such as safety lamps were “obligatory”, but there was an assurance that “no 
explosions (had) ever taken place in the history of the district”.18 The Witbank 
Colliery declared that Witbank coal was “specially noted for its freedom from 
any tendency towards spontaneous combustion”.19 Such claims could be made, in 
spite of the July 1926 fire, as the cause of the fire had never been established. 
Still, there was no certainty that such incidents would not recur. In spite of the 
visible risks of coal mining, the industry continued to develop and expand into 
the 1930s. 
Marketing energy 
The influence of the Witbank Colliery had long been the basis for Witbank’s 
economic growth and expansion. This was consolidated throughout the 1920s, as 
the company began to expand its scope in the production of electricity. In 1920, 
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under Section 27 of the Power Act of 1910 of the Transvaal, the company was 
granted permission to “supply electric power to the Town Council and Muni-
cipality of Witbank”.20 Signed by the Minister of Mines and Industries, this per-
mission was granted for ten years, with rates not exceeding 3 pence per unit. The 
electric power would be supplied on a “3-phase alternating system of 50 cycles 
per second … and the point of delivery … in the Company’s Main Generating 
Station at its Colliery”.21 The company had also arranged to sell most of its 
generated power to the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (VFTPC).22 
Coal was readily available in Witbank, but a central concern of the VFTPC was 
the availability of water for the station. In January, 1924, the VFTPC appealed to 
the Water Court in Pretoria for permission to impound water from the Olifants 
River for the Witbank Station.23 The present license of the VFTPC did not allow 
them to supply power outside of the Rand, but they sold most of their power to 
Escom, who, in turn, supplied power to the South African Railways. A represent-
ative of the VFTPC argued to the Water Court that as Escom expanded, “their 
demand for water (would) increase”.24  
By 1927, Escom’s national grid was complete. This was referred to as its first 
‘Electric Lighting System’.25 Soon, more power stations were constructed near 
known reserves of coal, allowing for reduced capital expenditure. Their prox-
imity to coal and water helped reduce the costs involved in coal production. 
These included the Klip, Wilge and Vierfontein power stations, all providing 
coal-fired power to the national electricity grid serviced by Escom.  
A rapidly expanding energy market required cheap and abundant supplies of 
coal. Transvaal power stations of the 1920s were designed accordingly. Where 
coal quality was poor, carbon concentration was reduced, and the existence of 
impurities was greater. Stacks were constructed with the capacity to burn at 
higher or lower temperatures, enabling the consumption of low quality coal. The 
Witbank Colliery saw this as the “commencement of an assured market for … 
duff coal”.26 The creation of such a market for duff coal was met with mixed 
responses from the coal industry. Despite the certainty of markets, the selling 
price for duff coal remained extremely low, and could “scarcely be reckoned a 
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profitable part of the work of any colliery”.27 This was countered with the argu-
ment that the benefits of the power stations would result in further investment in 
the Witbank area, leading to greater consumer markets for coal. The Power 
Companies Commission had argued that the use of duff coal would conserve coal 
resources, preventing the build-up of coal waste sites.28 In fact, the coal dumps 
continued to grow. At least one of these was situated in the central business dis-
trict of Witbank.29 
 
 
Photo 3.2 Advertisement for Witbank 
 (Witbank News, December 12, 1930) 
 
 
Duff coal may have aided the economic ‘conservation’ of coal resources, but 
its consumption exacerbated environmental conditions. Burning low quality coal 
released significantly more fly ash into the atmosphere than higher quality stock. 
Fly ash, previously referred to as clinker, was the ashen residue of coal com-
bustion. The chemical composition of fly ash was complex, and often retained 
the sulphur, magnesium and mercury, amongst other minerals, found in the fossil 
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fuel. Coal combustion at higher temperatures in the numerous power stations 
further reduced the emission of sulphur into the atmosphere. This gave some 
credence to the public conception that household silverware would not “tarnish 
so easily” in the era of domestic electrical power “for there (was) much less 
sulphur in the air”.30 South African coal was typically low in sulphur content. 
Still, at least half of the sulphur remained in the pervasive fly ash. This was 
spread by wind and rain throughout the district, gradually polluting land re-
sources of the district, and shifting perceptions of coal-based pollution.31  
Responsibility for tackling concerns around pollution was retained by the 
Department of Mines and Industries. This was emphasized in a 1931 letter by 
then-Minister of External Affairs J.B.M. Hertzog, advising the British Water 
Pollution Research Organization to contact the Secretary of the Department of 
Mines and Industries “for any information it may desire on the subject of the 
pollution of rivers in the Union of South Africa”.32 The Department of Mines and 
Industries acknowledged the existence of pollution as a consequence of coal 
mining and combustion, but little was done to ameliorate conditions. Monitoring 
and preventing industrial pollution was not a priority, particularly in light of the 
value of electricity in speeding up industrialization. Witbank had been elevated 
from the “poverty of a sparsely populated veld to the wealth of a populous and 
progressive town”.33 The environmental costs of this were thus seen as unavoid-
able. 
Before electricity, energy creation for domestic cooking and heating had in-
volved the onerous use and maintenance of coal. One housewife quoted in an 
Escom publication argued that even those who missed the romantic “crackle and 
traditional appeal” of a coal fire were “willing to concede the immense useful-
ness of the electric heater”.34 On the surface, coal-fired electrical energy ap-
peared to be entirely safe, clean and economical. This type of manoeuvring 
typified Escom’s marketing strategy. The power company aimed at creating 
further need for electricity, and encouraged the higher purchase of numerous 
household electric appliances. It emphasized the new convenience, and even 
luxury, attained by those on the power grid. This early marketing strategy en-
trenched the association between electricity and modernity. A 1933 engineering 
publication described electricity as providing salvation from the “dirt, depression 
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and disease” and “oppression of the smoke pall”.35 These would be eradicated 
and replaced with “cleanliness, brightness and health … as the work done by the 
steam engine and the coal fire (was) taken over by electric motors and electric 
radiators and cookers”.36 Escom played on a moral panic that emphasized access 
to energy as the only way of preventing an atavistic throw-back to pre-industrial 
conditions where housewives would be reliant on dirty, onerous coal fires to get 
their work done. Without power, the progress of industry and urban development 
would be lost, but the potential costs of this were not discussed.  
Escom’s domestic consumer market was thus stimulated through altering the 
general perception of an acceptable standard of living. In part, pressure to con-
form to this new lifestyle resulted in the production of an energy market.37 While 
the grid already existed, the marketing of coal-fired power was geared towards 
the production of a new domestic consumer, firmly establishing Escom’s politi-
cal and economic importance. 
Coal: 1,000 uses for man  
(The) power stations are here … the mines are here … we have coal. You look at industry – 
there is steel – it is here.38 
The emergence of a local steel industry was a major turning point for coal 
expansion. This was illustrated in early 1927, when the Iron and Steel Industry 
Bill was read in parliament twice, reflecting the political significance of indus-
trial growth at the time. Addressing parliament, the Minister of Defense, Colonel 
F.H. Creswell, argued that “the whole material” of modern civilization had 
emerged “from the discovery … that the heat energy locked up in coal could, by 
the intervention of suitable machines made of iron, be converted to a 1,000 uses 
for man”.39 Industrial growth and moral enlightenment were enmeshed within 
this understanding of coal-fired power. The Iron and Steel Industry Bill passed 
quickly through parliament. The Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor) was estab-
lished in 1928, chaired by Dr Hendrick van der Bijl. The parastatal would stimu-
late the local production of steel to ease over-reliance on imported steel.  
                                                 
35  ‘The manifold uses of electricity’, The SA Electricity Review & Engineer, reprinted in the Witbank 
News, September 22, 1933, p. 6. 
36  Ibid.  
37   According to Michel de Certeau, consumer production formed a covert form of marketing in that it 
did “not manifest itself through its own products, but rather through its ways of using the products 
imposed by a dominant economic order.” De Certeau, M., The practice of everyday life, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1984, p. xiii. 
38  Interview with Kaizer Mabena, representative of the Emalahleni South African National Civic Organi-
sation (SANCO), SANCO Offices, Thushanang, June 4, 2008. 
39  Houghton, H. & J. Dagut, eds, Source material on the South African economy: 1860-1970, Volume 3, 
1920-1970, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1973, p. 92. 
41 
  
In 1928 the Minister of Justice, Tielman Roos, argued that the great abundance 
of easily obtainable, high-quality coal could “never mean a great export trade by 
itself”.40 This resonated within the Witbank coal industry, particularly with the 
discovery of abundant coal measures suitable for use in the process of steel 
production. Coking coal was generally of a higher quality than most bituminous 
coal. This made it possible for it to undergo a distillation process to remove its 
volatile components. The solid-fuel product could then be used, with iron, in the 
production of steel. Suitable coking coal was found in the Navigation Colliery of 
the SA Coal Estates (Witbank).41 Iscor negotiated a contract for a provisional 
25,000 raw tons of good coking coal per month to be delivered to the Pretoria 
steel works.42 This resulted in broader recognition of Witbank as a site for in-
dustrial development, and by 1934, the first South African steel was tapped.43 A 
1936 marketing brochure of Witbank, introduced by Dr van der Bijl, highlighted 
the town as ideal for “the industrialist seeking a location for his activities”.44 
Escom had been successful in its efforts to crystallize the domestic market for 
electricity. Energy requirements had steadily grown over the decade, and by 
1939, general electricity consumption had increased over 17 per cent from the 
previous year.45  
The modernity heralded by domestic electrification did not extend to the 
separated African locations which, by the end of the war, had thousands of 
residents. Thushanang was incorporated into a greater area known as Kwa-Guqa; 
other areas included Vosman and Hlahlanikahle. These areas had been con-
structed specifically to fall outside of Witbank’s municipal boundary.46  
Industrial growth and ecological effects  
during the Second World War 
The rapidity of South Africa’s war-era economic growth was unprecedented, 
with concomitant implications for Witbank’s environment. Sudden demand from 
a range of both domestic and foreign buyers required quick increases of output. 
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Industrial expansion grew exponentially, owing largely to foreign geo-political 
uncertainties which stimulated foreign demand for local coal. Geological surveys 
done in the Witbank coalfields placed the extractive potential of the entire district 
at “roughly” 4½ trillion tons. The global total output estimate at this point was 
just under 1½ trillion tons.47 Foreign investors looked towards Witbank more 
closely than ever before for cheap raw and coking coal. The extractive capacity 
of most coal mines was thus stretched to the limit. Railways were equally hard-
pushed to transport the bulky commodity. Witbank’s numerous collieries were 
overwhelmed with orders, and mine expansion was necessary to meet demands.  
Politician and industrialist Dr Hendrik van der Bijl became the Director-
General of War Supplies in 1938. He headed the construction of forty new 
factories, and the conversion of over six hundred factories to support the war 
effort. This included Iscor, which had expanded its ingot steel capacity, ef-
fectively becoming a war factory.48 Industrial activity was sped up to meet the 
needs of the war-oriented state. This placed heavy demands upon the coal 
industry, whose profit margins were narrow. Instead of raising capital for new 
mining companies, Dr van der Bijl suggested that “the balance of the require-
ments” of coal orders could be provided by the existing collieries. This would 
involve extracting the “millions of tons of coal … left either on the floor or roof 
of their miles of workings”.49 The coal had been left behind in adherence to the 
safety requirements of environmental engineering design to ensure the structural 
integrity of the ceiling, as well as for its relatively low calorific value. At a time 
when industry needed it most, the “low cost would more than compensate for its 
admitted low grade”.50 With war time inflation, and narrow profit margins, it was 
more economically viable to return to abandoned mining sites to extract the 
remaining coal from pillars left to hold up the ground. This secondary extraction 
violated fundamental principles of environmental engineering employed in the 
initial design of the underground mines.51  
Also known as ‘pillar robbing’, this method “had a marked effect on the en-
vironment”.52 Pillar and bord mines had been designed according to a “chequer-
board” system of pillars, generally six square metres thick.53 In light of the 
demands of a voracious economy, these spherical pillars were “whittled down to 
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the narrowest possible safety margin”.54 While the original rate of extraction was 
approximately 75 per cent of underground coal, subsequent pillar robbing re-
sulted in only 25 per cent of the original pillars being left behind. This created a 
higher likelihood of collapse.55 When the pillars were robbed, what remained of 
them had to hold up the weight of the mine ceiling, placing tremendous pressure 
on the strata above and below the mine.56 If the compression was too great, 
subsidence would occur. This meant that the surface layer of compressed topsoil 
would drop down to the floor level of the underground workings. The release of 
oxygen into the workings through crevices, or crown-holes, would feed smoul-
dering underground fires, increasing the density of steam and toxic smoke visible 
at the surface.  
Even as closed mines in the Witbank coalfield were robbed of pillars during 
the war years, up to two thousand tons of duff and low grade coal were dumped 
daily at Witbank’s numerous waste sites. Despite “the immense tonnage of good 
coal that (was) dumped as waste in Witbank”, it was neither economically viable 
nor technically feasible to rehabilitate the dumps.57 While ‘recycling’ waste coal 
for local markets may have sufficed, the quality required for foreign markets was 
generally higher, and the technique was not put into place.  
The influence of the war on the steel industry was noted by Dr. van der Bijl in 
1940. He argued that “no special steels” had been produced prior to the war.58 
The war had stimulated economic conditions for the production of “steels con-
sidered by experts to be equal in quality to the finest steels produced in any part 
of the world”.59 The “destruction of plant and equipment” in Britain had resulted 
in pressure placed on the South African Union to “supply a very wide area” with 
steel.60 Iron and steel showed the greatest expansion in the manufacturing sector, 
doubling net output from 9 to 18 per cent of total industrial output during the war 
years.61 In light of this, the SA Coal Estates (Witbank), whose contract with Iscor 
had been successfully maintained, was exhorted to speed up production. To ease 
pressure at the Pretoria steel works, the company erected a crushing and washing 
plant for preparing coking coal on site. This plant was, at the time, “the largest of 
its kind in the southern continent”.62 By December, 1940, “the largest particular 
increase” in the supply of coking coal was to Iscor, which had passed the ½ 
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million tons mark.63 The Navigation pit was worked extensively, yielding an 
annual output of ¾ of a million tons – apparently “without strain”.64 The new 
Iscor contract came into effect in 1942, increasing output expectations “to 
capacity of about one million tons, all of which (would) be coking coal for the 
steel works in Pretoria”.65 Between 1940 and 1942, total annual output grew at an 
average of 556,423 tons per annum.  
The Witbank Colliery more than doubled the yield from its reserves between 
the mid 1930s and the mid 1940s. While 68,934 tons were produced in February, 
1935, representing an average monthly output figure, by April, 1943, the average 
monthly output figure was just over 108,000 tons.66 The available monthly aver-
age output figures for the Coronation Colliery reveal a similar rapid expansion 
during this decade, coinciding with war-related economic expansion. Coal output 
for February, 1935, was 48,563. This more than doubled to 103,018 tons by 
December, 1943. By the early 1940s, both collieries of the Transvaal and 
Delagoa Bay Investment Company, including the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay 
Colliery and the Douglas Colliery, were worked to their maximum capacity.67 
Increased demand for coal related to the war-time economic conditions did not 
always result in accumulated profits for the coal companies. The Transvaal and 
Delagoa Bay Investment Company complained that working at maximum pres-
sure had incurred “considerable capital expenditure”.68 As far as the shareholders 
were concerned, colliery owners had responded to government calls for increased 
production. They had delivered on their responsibility, but received “no benefit 
whatever in the way of additional profits” and sensed that they were “depleting 
(their) reserve of coal entirely in the interests of the state”.69 Colliery owners also 
complained about heavy taxation, and the extent to which it was “wise or 
equitable to tax so heavily a company … which (was) exploiting a wasting as-
set”.70  
According to the available coal figures, the height of wartime coal production 
took place between 1942 and 1944, after which it began to tail off (see Graph 
3.1). Out of the four coal companies presented, only the South African Coal 
Estates (Witbank) experienced sustained growth during the years immediately 
following the war. Specific surges in coal production during the Second World 
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War led to further expansion of the town and industry, but this did not correlate 
with the capital expenditure of sinking new shafts, since costs were generally 
reduced through the wartime practice of pillar robbing in abandoned underground 
mines. 
 
 
 
 Graph 3.1 Monthly coal output figures (in tons), 1930-1947.  
 Source: Published data from the Witbank News between 1930 and 1947. 
 
 
The end of the war signalled a shift in the industry. Many collieries had 
exhausted their reserves. While some underground fires continued to burn, coal 
companies systematically exhausted the available coal reserves on their ex-
pansive land holdings. Mounting pressure during the war to produce coal, 
irrespective of economic or environmental constraints, had resulted in severe 
environmental implications.  
This included underground fires, water pollution and the collapse of the 
ground surface at exhausted mines, including Middelburg Steam, Station, Uit-
span, Apex, Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Colliery and Coronation Colliery.71 
Where it was observed, collieries had little space or incentive to remedy coal-
based pollution. The demands of the war had taken a toll on the natural resources 
of the Witbank district.  
Post-war conceptions of coal-based pollution  
The political significance of the Witbank coalfields during the war meant new 
threats of military attack by Italian or German forces from the north of Africa.72 
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Security officials argued that there would be at most thirty minutes warning of 
enemy planes approaching from the coast before the town was “plunged into 
inky blackness”.73 Fears existed that the Witbank blackout would be rendered 
futile because of the self-sustaining mine dump fires. They became “beacons … 
not only to Witbank, but Pretoria and the Witwatersrand”.74 The Axis powers 
never did invade Witbank, but a trial thirty minute blackout took place in 1942.75 
This attempt to make Witbank disappear – and, with it, the fruits of rapid 
industrial progress – was wholly disorienting. One pilot witnessed the attempt to 
hide the town in the countryside. He later described seeing the town “popping out 
here and there like bursting bubbles … there was the last section of street lights 
in Witbank off and – absolute blackness”.76 His account provides insight into the 
way electricity was conceived by the mid-twentieth century: a return to wilder-
ness, through the removal of power sources like electricity, seemed surreal, and 
“for a moment, (he) was assailed with the erie (sic) feeling of having lost the 
world”.77 After having momentarily lost the world, the pilot was “comforted by 
the mine dumps glowing cosily, seemingly flirting with one another as the flames 
winked in the breeze”.78 From an aerial vantage point, the dumps took on an 
ethereal dimension, ‘cosily’ framing the product of their own making: the coal 
town of Witbank.  
The harsh socio-economic conditions of the war popularized the idea of 
economizing resources. Rations existed for everything from petrol to paper. 
Natural resources, and their relative scarcity, were reconceived. The reclamation 
of abandoned workings for alternate land uses was never enforced by govern-
ment, even when agricultural interests were compromised. The gravity of the 
pollution, which involved loss of arable land, clean air and potable water for 
sustainable urban development, was only partially understood. The immediate 
impact of coal-based pollution was evident in the aging coal dumps and smoky 
Witbank horizon, but the diffusion of pollution was not as extensive as it would 
later become.79 A silent process of acid mine drainage (AMD) had been triggered 
by the extensive mining of the war years: the oxidation of pyrite from displaced 
strata within the coalfields gradually altered the pH balance of the water, result-
                                                 
73  ‘CPS: Civilian Protective Services: How a blackout is carried out’, Witbank News, March 6, 1942,  
p. 4. 
74  ‘Blackout’, Witbank News, June 12, 1942. 
75  ‘CPS’, Witbank News, March 6, 1942, p. 4. 
76  ‘The blackout from the air’, by Skylark, Witbank News, April 24, 1942, p. 3. 
77  Ibid.  
78  ‘The blackout from the air’, p. 3. 
79  See Bullock, S.E. & F.G. Bell, ‘Some problems associated with past mining at a mine in the Witbank 
Coalfield, South Africa’, Environmental Geology, 33, 1, December 1997, p. 1; Adler, R.A., Claassen, 
M., Godfrey, L., & A.R. Turton, Water, mining and waste: An historical and economic perspective on 
conflict management in South Africa, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2, 2, 2007, p. 34. 
47 
  
ing in highly acidic polluted waters entering the streams and catchments supply-
ing the town. In turn, acidic surface water would enter river catchments, leaching 
particles out of the soil, including various heavy metals like iron, aluminium and 
magnesium. Abandoned shallow underground coal shafts were often recharged as 
a result of rain water, affecting water tables in the district. The collapse of 
underground structures were contributing factors in the rising occurrence of acid 
mine drainage into river catchments leading into the town and surrounding dis-
trict. 
With the war-time growth of urban settlements, the severity of pollution 
increased. One resident later associated a “time when there (were) not so many 
companies” with a “good environment”.80 The danger of subsidence was not 
restricted to the remote industrial outskirts of the town – but also affected the 
town itself. By the mid-1940s, new regulations were established regarding land 
“which would have been of great value for building on”.81 Buildings were not 
allowed because they were undermined, posing the risk of subsidence “several 
feet below the surrounding level”.82 By 1944, the town had  
the atmosphere of a city of as many tens of thousands of people … it [was] closely packed 
and congested to the point of bursting in the place where there should be room to breathe.83  
The war had accelerated the gradual build up of pollution which could no 
longer be ignored. Government Notice No. 871, dated the 2nd of June, 1944, con-
stituted a significant shift in State conceptions of coal-based pollution. The notice 
announced the establishment of the inter-departmental Committee of Enquiry on 
the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies. It was appointed 
by the Minister of Welfare and Demobilization  
to enquire into, report upon and make recommendations … in connection with the incidence 
throughout the Union of bacterial and chemical pollution of water supplies used or which 
may be used for domestic purposes, including livestock, both in urban and rural areas.84  
Chaired by Dr A.J. van der Spuy of the Health Department, this committee 
included a team of experts from the Departments of Health, Public Works, 
Irrigation and Agriculture. This research body made use of extensive “oral 
evidence tendered by the Government Mining Engineer”.85 Existing legislation 
was analyzed – revealing that while “wide legislative powers exist(ed) for the 
prevention of pollution … there (was) little machinery to implement these 
powers”.86 In particular, the Public Health Act of 1919 placed the onus of 
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preventing pollution of local water supplies upon local authorities for purifying 
supplies which had become polluted, and for taking legal measures against “any 
person polluting any such supply … so as to be a nuisance or danger to health”.87 
No regulations existed to guide local authorities on how they could both prevent 
and mitigate waste water pollution of streams and rivers. None of this was made 
public – an undated letter from the Secretary of Health to the Deputy Chief 
Health Officer confirmed that this concern was being treated “as strictly 
confidential” as the government had “not yet considered it fully”.88 By 1948, the 
Report of the Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pol-
lution of Water Supplies was presented in parliament.89 This report was the first 
to tackle the difficulty of implementing existing legislation dealing with mining 
and industry-based pollution. It constituted an official state recognition of the 
inability of local authorities to control the effects of industrial waste, particularly 
mining.  
The report listed industries culpable in the production of waste water. Gold 
and coal mining were notably placed at the top of this rather lengthy list of 
polluters. The pollution was linked to a wide range of industrial production, 
revealing to the Committee the “large number of industrial processes in which 
problems of treatment and disposal of polluting waste waters have to be con-
sidered”.90 Contributing factors towards water pollution were classified under 
three headings, including chemical, bacteriological/organic, and mechanical. This 
did much to emphasize the relationship between coal mining and pollution, but 
the rather narrow formulation of categories of pollution only partially grappled 
with the multifarious, largely hidden, environmental implications of coal pro-
duction processes. Coal was cited in two out of the three technical classifications, 
including ‘chemical’ and ‘mechanical’. While mechanical pollution was attri-
buted to the process of coal washing, the Committee argued that this could be 
“obviated by the simple method of sedimentation”.91 Chemical pollution was 
defined as the  
discharge of industrial effluents into rivers or streams, either directly or indirectly and in 
addition many underground sources of supply [were] naturally polluted by an excess of 
chemical salts which render the water unfit for consumption by man or beast or agricultural 
purposes. The discharge of such effluents, especially those from gold and coal mines, [had] 
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caused acute and chronic poisoning in stock and has also rendered excellent arable land 
totally unsuitable for agricultural purposes.92  
The report did not provide guidelines for resolving the problem, but it was an 
ecological turning point in state conceptions of the environmental impact of the 
South African coal industry. For the first time, the state fully acknowledged the 
adverse influence of mining over alternate forms of resource management, such 
as agriculture. This provided some agency to farmers, both black and white, 
whose livelihood had been devastated through poisoned water sources and 
diminished land quality. The process of urbanization was accelerated as farmers 
recognized the long-term implications of ceding mineral rights to companies like 
the Witbank Colliery – after all, their land had become ‘totally unsuitable’ for 
anything other than mining. With the loss of land use, a growing contingent of 
Witbank residents, especially farmers, began to seriously question the viability of 
coal mining in the district.  
The relative impotence of agricultural bodies in preventing water pollution is 
reflected in a 1946 Memorandum on the Irrigation Amendment Bill which was 
sent from the Director of Irrigation to the Secretary of the Treasury. The 
Department of Irrigation complained that it was “hampered in its operations by a 
lack of certain legislative powers” despite recognition “that the conservation of 
water (was) an undertaking of national importance”.93 This had the effect of 
disempowering the Department from assisting in the maintenance of irrigation 
works on riparian land affected by mining.  
As collieries such as the SA Coal Estates and the Witbank Colliery exhausted 
their existing reserves during the war, they abandoned shafts, either before or 
after extracting the remaining reserves. By the late 1940s, many of these sites 
began to decant acid water onto the surface, with the result that the Committee 
recognized that “many rivers and streams, particularly those flowing through 
industrial areas, (were) badly polluted”.94 The Committee cited Section 137 of 
the Irrigation Act (No 8) of 1921, in an attempt to “draw particular attention to 
the immunity enjoyed by the mines in discharging chemically contaminated 
water into streams”.95 With continued industrial growth, and the “provision of 
more houses with modern conveniences … there [was] certain to be an appre-
ciable increase in the next few years in the quantity of water of good quality 
required”.96 Local authorities, particularly in Witbank, were neither politically 
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nor financially equipped to take on the dual responsibility of facilitating urban 
growth and ameliorating coal-based pollution. The Witbank coal industry was 
largely unwilling to do so, as the cost of rectifying water sources would be large 
and time-consuming. The compilers of the Report had sensed “general appre-
hension” from the coal industry, which had come to regard the pollution as an 
inevitable opportunity cost of coal production. While the report conceded that 
“absolute prevention of pollution” was not realistic, it maintained that “by tight-
ening up the present powers”, it was possible to reduce pollution “down to 
reasonable limits without a serious additional charge on industry”.97  
By accepting that pollution, on some level, was an inevitable part of industry, 
the Committee abated the criticism of pro-mining government officials. At the 
same time, the discussion introduced the complicated task of reducing and regu-
lating pollution. In a district with ongoing industrial activity, and widespread 
environmental damage, the polluter was often tricky to isolate. It was not pos-
sible to blame the TCOA or Chamber of Mines, and expect these representative 
organizations to deal with the accumulated pollution that had begun to spread 
throughout the district.  
Individual collieries were hardly ever held liable, even if the relationship could 
be proven, as this was generally “impossible to do after the impact occurred, the 
mine had been closed or the company was dismantled”.98 The Committee argued 
that “the average member of the community hardly realize(d) the problems of 
water supply and the precautions necessary in protecting gathering grounds and 
wells from being polluted”.99 The reason for lack of interest in urban areas was 
attributed to the reliable supply of clean water from local authorities. This ar-
gument suggested that there was little incentive for urban dwellers to question 
the availability of water, especially in a town like Witbank, where most industry 
– and employment – was somehow connected to the coal industry. With only 
limited impact on natural resources, many chose not to notice the gradual 
changes in their environmental conditions.  
The ‘tightening up of power’, as suggested by the Committee to reduce the 
risk of water pollution, included setting up regional water control boards which 
would represent populations. This proposal was aimed at creating “a greater 
interest being taken by the people”.100 One of the main duties of the water control 
boards would be to enforce existing legislation in the prevention of “undue 
pollution of water sources”.101 The Committee did not outline what constituted a 
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‘reasonable’ level of pollution, demonstrating limited scientific conceptions of 
the capacity of coal mining to pollute. Future generations would bear the brunt of 
this invisible scourge.  
By the time the pollution became noticeable, the mines had “typically closed 
or become insolvent”.102 There was, in fact, no one to be held accountable. They 
could not be impelled to “contribute to remediation, either financially or through 
other actions”.103 Mine closure meant little more than abandoning shafts. These 
sites effectively became waste lands, whose potential for productive use was 
compromised, and ultimately destroyed, by unchecked pollution. The industry 
thus “took advantage of weak governmental regulations by externalizing 
costs”.104 Environmental factors played a very significant role in determining the 
“bio-physical limits”105 of economic growth, but these were largely hidden from 
the public, and obscured in the balance sheets of the Witbank coal companies. 
The absence of regulation in the selection of land to be mined – resulting in 
indiscriminate mining – reflects the failure of the government to recognize long-
term ecological damage, and the strength of public perception that the benefits of 
coal outweighed its costs.  
Conclusion 
Remnants of abandoned mines had become a regular feature of the town by the 
mid 1940s. Smoke stacks and massive conveyer belts worked in tandem to create 
a uniquely industrialized vista. This was celebrated as a part of the financial 
windfall of coal mining activity between the early 1930s and late 1940s, with 
little focus on the growing phenomenon of localized coal-based pollution, 
including underground fires, subsidence and coal dumps. Evidence of pollution 
did little to persuade views related to the benefits of intensified coal production 
and combustion in the district. The Report of the Departmental Committee of 
Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies re-
flected changing views which saw the need to control and monitor coal-based 
pollution. However, its existence in the industrial region was seen as impossible. 
The Report highlighted a list of major polluters, including the coal industry. Post-
war reconstruction thus involved research to develop policies which would assist 
in the monitoring and control of pollution. The next chapter will assess debates 
around these decision-making processes, which ultimately led to the emergence 
of South Africa’s first legislation aimed at minimizing pollution.  
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4 
Responses to the changing  
atmosphere of post-war  
Witbank, 1948-1965  
Introduction 
Post-war reconstruction involved significant shifts in the way pollution was 
understood. The evolving systems of knowledge related to the coal industry now 
expanded in both general scope and depth of understanding. This interest was no 
coincidence in the post-war economy, which continued to experience growth on a 
massive scale. Pollution had become widespread after the war. The profusion of 
air pollution in cities throughout the world had pushed local scientists to inter-
rogate the relationship between the mining industry and its contribution to air 
pollution. This chapter will evaluate debates around pollution that took place in 
the decades immediately following the Second World War, resulting in the emer-
gence of South Africa’s first legislation aimed at minimizing pollution.  
Witbank simultaneously experienced loss – with the abandonment of exhaust-
ed coal shafts – and gain – with the injection of new capital investment into 
mining and industry. New factories opened, and several state-funded power 
stations were built to support the national grid that delivered electricity to towns 
throughout the country. With its sprawling expansion of urban and peri-urban 
residential and industrial development, the large population of the Witbank coal-
field had become plagued by atmospheric pollution, contributing to high rates of 
lung disease, particularly bronchitis, asthma and tuberculosis. This chapter will 
outline the findings of the national committees, scientists and task teams who 
worked towards passing of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act in 1965. 
The research conducted before any parliamentary decision could be made regard-
ing its promulgation was pivotal in changing conceptions of coal-based pollution.  
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Growth, prosperity and environmental change  
in the post-war coal town, 1948-1952  
By the late 1940s, coal-based pollution had become a regular part of life in 
industrial Witbank. Soon after the war ended, several Johannesburg-based jour-
nalists from the Star newspaper drove to Witbank to investigate rumours of an 
underground fire which had broken to the surface near a public road en route to 
the town. The fire had raged for a week, with “flames shooting up out of the 
earth”.1 The arrival of the journalists was met with surprise by residents, who 
found it difficult to comprehend “why any fuss was being made of the latest 
blaze”.2 Sites such as the Apex mine described in the national daily were com-
mon throughout the district. They were isolated, and thus did not disrupt growth 
of the town. The visit of these journalists was thus significant in demonstrating 
the complacency of both the industry and residents of the coal town to localized 
signs of coal-based pollution. 
Demand for Witbank’s coal had been largely uninterrupted after the Second 
World War ended. Bunker trade was adversely affected by the fuel-conversion of 
ships from coal to oil, but local demand continued to grow.3 The local industry 
was thus largely protected from a post-war slump that hindered other economic 
activity, and maintained a competitive advantage after the war. The state relaxed 
numerous restrictions that had held back capital expansion during the war, thus 
stimulating a new era of coal exploration. New shafts were sunk throughout the 
coalfield, and by the end of the decade, over two thirds of the Transvaal’s col-
lieries were situated in Witbank.4  
A number of chemical processing plants emerged along the edge of the town, 
often bordering long-abandoned mining areas. This new economic activity 
helped secure Witbank’s emergence as a regional manufacturing centre.5 These 
plants often served the mines. One notable example was Rand Carbide, which 
had been built “out in the sticks”, away from residential areas.6 The factory 
produced carbide, a compound fusion of carbon and metal used in the headlamps 
of miners. The Cynamid factory was also established in the district, producing 
cyanide, a poisonous acid used to extract gold from ore in refineries. Another 
notable plant was Ferrometals, built close to the old Transvaal and Delagoa Bay 
Colliery.  
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Escom had grown significantly during the war years. As the nature of coal 
production changed, so did that of energy, thus affecting the relationship between 
the energy parastatal and the state. By 1947 the Electricity Act of 1922 was 
amended to suit the changing policies of an increasingly protectionist state. It 
soon monopolized South African energy, such that pre-existing bodies such as 
the Victoria Falls Power Company were outmoded. Domestic and industrial sale 
of units of electricity had finally grown large enough to warrant a national grid – 
serviced by Escom, and largely powered by Witbank coal. The massive demand 
for munitions during the war had also increased steel demand. Production thus 
expanded to facilitate further output. Several Iscor plants emerged throughout the 
district as the company grew. Witbank coal, as part of the ever-growing Trans-
vaal coal industry, was one of the few coal centres able to increase output to meet 
the demand of local and foreign consumers after the war. The greatest problem at 
this point was not the availability of coal, but rather the lack of adequate trans-
portation to carry coal to markets. By 1951, shortages were experienced as the 
railways were unable to deliver coal to markets. The state responded during the 
winter of 1951 by placing an embargo on the export of coal, temporarily re-
lieving local markets.7 This embargo was short-lived, but transport problems 
would continue to plague the Witbank coal industry for decades to come.8 
New corporate structuring characterized the growth of Witbank’s coal trade in 
the second half of the century. A major economic turning point for local indus-
trial growth was the involvement of the Anglo American Corporation in Witbank 
after it experienced a massive financial windfall with the discovery of gold in the 
Orange Free State in 1949. The mining finance house soon amassed enormous 
profits, allowing it to dabble in other mineral interests, purchasing land through-
out the coalfield. At least three collieries had opened since the middle of the war 
to supply Iscor with coking coal, including the Springbok Colliery.9 The com-
pany also took over several pre-existing coal companies, including the SA Coal 
Estates. Many other collieries closed down as they exhausted their reserves. 
Damage to mined land was written off by both the companies and the local 
municipality. General industrial practice was to level the cost against capital 
gain; public officials thus had little choice but to regard such land as ‘under-
mined’. The term soon took on several layers of meaning: not only did it allude 
to the subterranean pillar and bord mining methods widely employed, but also 
implied the loss of land use as a result of the advancing signs of surface de-
gradation. Signs of this included the hardening and subsidence of the land, which 
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had become too dry and desiccated to sustain life, as well as acid mine pollution 
of varying intensities. Areas where coal mining had taken place were usually 
affected in some way, and thus long-term localized coal-based pollution played a 
significant role in the urban development of Witbank and its surrounding areas.10 
Growth of the town – and informal townships – was thus determined by the 
bio-physical limitations of this unusable land. These sites had become desiccated 
blights of brown patchy terrain, “woefully short of trees” in a place that was 
already “generally drab”.11 Locations surrounding the town had started emerging 
in the 1920s, but their size and population density was notably greater after the 
war.12 These included Thushanang, Vosman and Lynnville, amongst others.13 In 
these bustling working class townships built on the verge of underground fires 
and dumps, and down-wind from factories and power stations, the lives of 
African, Indian and foreign temporary and permanent migrants coalesced. The 
eclectic population included the families of the African miners living in long 
brown brick mine compounds built relatively close to accessible coal seams. As 
the locations developed, they verged dangerously closer to mining sites. The 
physical separateness enshrined in the Group (Urban) Areas act of 1952 was en-
trenched by the insurmountable borders created by these relics of pre-war mining 
activity. Pollution, or disruption, thus took on a political nature. Apartheid thus 
entrenched the racialized “geographical isolation” of these locations.14  
Witbank prospered after the war, providing both industrial and agricultural 
output to a growing economy. The two economic enterprises simultaneously 
made use of available natural resources, but it soon became apparent that these 
two activities were incompatible, particularly when it came to the pollution of 
natural water sources. In its ecologically monumental report of 1948, the Depart-
mental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of 
Water Supplies had argued that the welfare of the South African economy was 
“bound up” with the health of her natural resources.15 Without access to potable 
water, post-war urban expansion would be severely compromised. Evidence 
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linking mining and mine-based water pollution already existed. These included 
reports that rivers such as the Komati, which formed part of the catchment 
entering the Loskop Dam, were being “badly polluted” by “mining going on in 
the upper regions”.16 Despite this, further investigation was necessary, with em-
phasis on the coordination of research into the full arena of environmental prob-
lems related to “the purity and suitability of surface and underground water”.17 
The need for coordination of policy planning around natural resources had 
already been realized by 1947, with the formation of the national Natural 
Resources Development Board (NRDB).18 This directorate was preoccupied with 
South Africa’s natural resources, but its intent was not to prevent pollution or 
conserve resources for posterity. The NRDB was formed to investigate the most 
effective means of exploiting and developing natural resources, and was largely 
concerned with small town growth planning to attract more industry and thus 
balance out the distribution of enterprise throughout the country.19  
A regional NRDB was formed in Witbank in 1949. This representative body 
reflected a new consciousness concerned with better utilization and control of 
local resources, particularly in light of the vast demand for South African natural 
resources during post-war reconstruction in Europe, Britain and the USA. In 
1953, F.G.J. Du Toit, chairman of the council, argued that South Africa should 
“not be so eager to sell all its raw materials”.20 This included coal, which had 
gained value amid global shortages. The efforts of both regional and national 
bodies thus changed public conceptions of raw materials.  
Conceptions around natural resource conservation related to the war-time 
mentality of scarcity. Conservation was thus understood to be based on the need 
to conserve in case of future conflict, which would adversely affect access to 
resources. The notion that coal was super-abundant was thus replaced with a 
mentality bent on resource conservation for local use. However, even as con-
ceptions changed, little attention was given to the pollution of resources affected 
by the extraction of raw materials, particularly coal, which had been listed in the 
1948 Report of Enquiry as a chief pollutant. The question of coal-based pollution 
remained secondary, and largely ignored, but this period did see some change in 
attitudes towards natural resources as the relative scarcity of this valuable fossil 
fuel was brought to the fore.  
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Public health and coal-based pollution in the industrial age,  
1946-1955 
Soon after the war the Government Mining Engineer (GME) reported that almost 
42 per cent of deaths on mines were a result of exposure to fumes in accidental 
explosions.21 The frequency of gas-related fatalities forced the mining industry to 
pay greater attention to its occupational health policies. The pre-existing structure 
tasked with training selected miners in fire-fighting and underground rescue ope-
rations was first centralized under a management committee, and taken over by 
the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines in 1946.22 This Central 
Rescue Training Station trained selected underground mine workers to deal with 
the fumes encountered during operations. These included carbon monoxide, car-
bon dioxide and methane, amongst others.  
These revelations irrefutably debunked earlier conceptions that the Witbank 
coal seams were free from spontaneous combustion. Not only were these fumes 
responsible for many unprecedented and deadly underground explosions, but 
mere inhalation could have dire health implications. Coal workers were constant-
ly at risk of damaging their lungs through dust inhalation. The health risk of 
exposure included a host of coal-dust-related diseases, whose relative severity 
depended on the chemical composition of the coal dust itself.23 Considerable 
inhalation of dust over an extended period was likely to result in common pneu-
moconiosis, a relatively mild condition. The more intensive version of this was 
known as coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, which could develop into progressive 
massive fibrosis, where a “dense mass of fibrous tissue (could) occupy much of, 
if not the entire, lung”.24 Less debilitating was athrocosis, a black deposit of car-
bon particles on the lungs. Coal and rock dust containing considerable volumes 
of free silica caused anthrocosilicosis, a condition resulting in “extensive fibrosis 
with associated functional changes”.25 With over fifty thousand coal miners in 
South Africa, the risk of fatal or debilitating occupational exposure had become a 
major concern.26  
South Africa’s post-war industrial era was, in part, characterized by the image 
of smoke billowing out of smoke stacks situated within its numerous industrial 
complexes. These were often engulfed by a haze of smoke and airborne chemical 
compounds released from any number of industrial and chemical processes. 
Hence, the risk of exposure to harmful smoke and gases was not restricted to 
those employed in mining. Although not as intensive as experienced by workers 
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underground, environmental exposure was widespread. The increase of air pol-
lution heightened the risk of lung cancer for residents, and also had deleterious 
effects on those suffering from ailments such as asthma. By 1953, tuberculosis 
had escalated to the level of a national epidemic – with a daily death rate of fifty 
five for all races. Air pollution had a particularly harmful effect on sufferers of 
tuberculosis, whose lung capacity was gravely compromised within a context of 
diffuse smoke and harmful airborne chemicals.27 The high altitude of the High-
veld region exacerbated the rapid degeneration of air quality in Witbank, where 
particularly harmful particles released from power stations, factories and che-
mical plants had affected local air quality.  
Local experiences and responses to atmospheric pollution were likely influen-
ced by the international wave of scrutiny to this problem. In fact, the topic of 
atmospheric pollution had grabbed the attention of scientists worldwide. The 
problem was underscored after it became apparent that smog – and its dangers – 
was becoming an international pandemic. The most noted incident of ‘fatal’ 
smog had occurred in December of 1952, when the city of London was struck by 
smog whose toxicity was unprecedented. According to a subsequent report, inert 
weather conditions had “held the city’s air close to the ground and … prevented 
the formation of winds which would have dispersed the pollutants that were 
accumulating heavily at ground level”.28 In a city where coal had been a staple 
energy source for over a century, the impact of the five-day-long ‘pea-soup’ 
smog was pivotal in changing conceptions of coal-based pollution. The changes 
were not merely those of perception, but directly affected the consumption of 
coal in the city. By 1956, the Clean Air Act had been passed, banning the burn-
ing of coal in the city of London. It also removed “much of the visible pollution 
from Britain’s skies”.29 The Clean Air Act set a global precedent in the fight 
against atmospheric pollution.  
The mid-1950s presaged a turning point in environmental consciousness. The 
calculations of one scientist had even begun to surmise the possibility of global 
warming through continued consumption of fossil fuels, particularly coal.30 
During this time, scientist Charles David Keeling developed the technology to 
measure global carbon dioxide levels. His measurements showed that these levels 
were steadily rising.31 According to Kolbert, the fact that the rise in carbon 
dioxide levels was measured so long ago lends credence to the notion that “the 
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changes that can be seen lag behind the changes that have been set in motion”.32 
With over one century of rising global consumption of fossil fuels, it was only by 
the mid-twentieth century that the visible changes began to garner government 
attention. In South Africa, the stimulus for radical legislative reform was rooted 
in the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). One CSIR liaison 
officer, Mr. Masson, based then in Washington DC, began to study the effects of 
air pollution in the United States. He was motivated by the belief that “something 
should be done”.33 The preliminary research conducted by the CSIR was em-
phasized in 1953, when the port city of Durban experienced a severe bout of 
smog related to industrial emissions. The ability of the council to mobilize was 
limited under existing legislation. The Durban Town Council had little legal 
influence other than the Health Act. This Act was limited, as it gave local 
authorities powers to act only when dealing with a distinct health “nuisance”.34 
This excluded ameliorating the exigent conditions of “general smokiness” 
plaguing Durban’s environment. This dealt a significant blow to the munici-
pality, as it was almost impossible for them to isolate industries in a complex 
where any number of companies could be the “causer of the nuisance”.35 This 
case embodied the air problem throughout the country. The CSIR had been the 
first national body to recognize that the problem was only getting worse, and 
began to lobby the Ministry of Health. 
The Minister of Health was receptive to these calls for state action, and 
appointed the first National Air Pollution Committee in 1955 to “investigate … 
and to make recommendations regarding the steps to ameliorate and, ultimately, 
eliminate the problem”.36 The committee was made up of numerous relevant 
government department representatives, the CSIR, provincial administrative re-
presentatives, local authorities and industrial representatives. After conducting 
the research, the committee reported that smoke had become a major problem in 
residential areas. It recommended that legislation be swiftly introduced “for the 
effective prevention and elimination of air pollution”.37 The Committee’s main 
achievement was the preparation of a draft bill largely influenced by measures 
applied in England and the United States. The report presented dealt with various 
kinds of air pollution, including coal and asbestos. The reference to asbestos 
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reflected an awareness of the dangers of environmental exposure – “not only for 
persons working in mines and industries, but also for those in the vicinity”.38  
Smoke was seen by the State as a local problem which could be dealt with by 
local authorities. However, the Committee argued that emission of gases and 
fumes from myriad industrial processes was beyond the capacity of local 
authorities, and could only be dealt with at a national level. The draft bill was 
presented to a Select Committee, whose task it was to “take evidence and call for 
documents”.39 This committee was unable to complete its work before parliament 
went into recess. It thus recommended that a commission be formed to deal with 
the continued implementation of findings related to atmospheric pollution.  
The newly formed Commission of Inquiry into the Air Pollution Prevention 
Bill was crucial in the debate around air pollution that ensued over the following 
decade. It would be small, and the process of implementation gradual, as the 
problem was not yet considered to have “assumed such proportions” as to justify 
the participation of “a large number of officials”.40 Most vocal in the deputation 
was Dr E.C. Halliday, a prominent scientist belonging to the National Physical 
Research Laboratory of the CSIR. It also included several notable members, 
including representatives of the South African Railways, the City Council of 
Durban, the Department of Mines, as well as the Government Mining Engineer. 
The inclusion of industrial representatives, who were the main polluters, in the 
Commission was significant. It seemingly overrode the potential conflict of inte-
rest created by such a move. Nonetheless, the draft bill provided “for the recog-
nition of the interests of industries, the mining industry and local authorities in 
connection with the administration of the Act”.41 This had the result of creating 
tremendous mistrust between state and civil society as the Department of Health 
gave “the impression of protecting bad polluters from the public rather than the 
other way about (sic)”.42  
Nonetheless, the report defended this move. It saw joint discussion between 
state and industry to be the only way to avoid “conflicting instructions of various 
pieces of legislation”.43 After all, private industry was “saddled with a burden” in 
having to gain approval from several authorities when embarking upon ende-
avours that could pollute.44 The sphere of the prospective legislation was broad, 
affecting a range of legislation dealing with factories and mines, as well as local 
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and municipal by-laws. Under existing legislation, the simultaneous enactment of 
different laws resulted in conflicting instructions, often holding back any form of 
resolution. It was thus desirable to implement “effective correlation” between the 
different forms of legislation as they all had “a bearing on the operation of the 
same industrial processes”.45 The realm of industry and mining in the process of 
enacting legislation was thus an accepted, and presumably important, part of 
dealing with the problem of air pollution.  
In spite of the considerable evidence of water pollution as a result of industrial 
activity, little attempt was made to minimize the damage of water pollution. 
Securing against the pollution of South Africa’s ‘wholesome’  
water supply 
The Report of the Departmental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological 
and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies had also granted special attention to 
the sustenance of “wholesome” water supplies.46 The Committee was influenced 
by the growing international interest in water quality, as well as water quantity, 
citing “similar bodies … constituted in countries overseas for administering the 
Rivers Pollution Prevention Acts”.47 The “purity of water supplies” was “gene-
rally recognized” as a “major factor” in public health – and lack of knowledge 
was seen as the common obstacle to any policy implementation and the “pre-
cautions necessary in protecting gathering grounds and wells from being pol-
luted”.48  
Regional water boards were recommended in the report: their key feature 
would be “to see that … undue pollution of water courses (was) not taking place 
in the regional areas under their respective control”.49 The report went on to 
argue that there was “certain to be an appreciable increase in the next few years 
in the quantity of water of good quality required in this country”.50 The report 
challenged how this “increase in demand” would be met, and recognized that 
“unfortunately many rivers and streams, particularly those flowing through in-
dustrial areas, (were) badly polluted”.51 The proliferation of “small” acts related 
to water resource management between the 1930s and 1940s had gradually 
increased state control over water resources, “culminating in the promulgation of 
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the 1956 Water Act”.52 Not only did the Act give rise to the Department of Water 
Affairs, but Section 23 of the Act empowered the Minister of Water Affairs to 
take preventive measures against pollution “as a result of seepage or drainage 
from any area on which mining operations have been carried on after such 
operations have been abandoned”.53 The United Municipal Executive of South 
Africa argued that water be “divided” between agriculture, industry, municipal 
use and mining such that “a balanced development” could take place”.54 The 
Minister of Irrigation argued that pre-existing bodies such as the Natural Re-
sources Development Council be used to implement new water management 
policies, despite the fact that the structure was not originally constituted for this 
purpose. This reflected a rapidly changing set of conceptions around water 
conservation and management, and that “in future specific provision … [is] made 
for the important aim of balanced development in the domain of water”. None-
theless, the 1956 legislation failed to conceive of the long-term incompatibility of 
simultaneous land practices.  
Changing conceptions of the post-war environment, 1956-1960 
Someone once remarked to me that ‘once the coal dust gets into your hair, you 
never get it out.’ How true! It seems if you are born on a coal mine, or have lived 
a number of years on one or near one, you usually die in the same vicinity.55  
The first half of the 1950s saw unprecedented expansion in Witbank’s indus-
try. The region continued to produce approximately half of the national output of 
bituminous coal destined for both local and foreign markets. A new trend in coal 
stockpiling developed amongst local consumers. These were geared towards 
protecting against backlogs from railway truck shortages, particularly over the 
winter months. The problem of inland coal transportation had affected coal 
supply so badly that by 1956 the state had placed an embargo on coal export that 
lasted until late 1958. Despite the relative self-sufficiency of local industry, no 
power station equipment was manufactured in South Africa. Escom thus still had 
to rely on foreign suppliers. With the construction of the Wilge Power Station 
near Kendal, Witbank coal now fed at least two power stations in the growing 
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industrial complex.56 This had a hugely disruptive effect on the balance of the 
local atmosphere.  
Air pollution involved both aesthetic and chemical changes. The pale horizon 
was now laced together by outlines of jutting cement smoke stacks and faded 
ash-black clouds of smoke. The proximity of these power stations to the town 
now hastened the quick-step of general environmental degradation within an 
already-compromised natural environment. Smoke was a definite concern 
amongst local residents, but it merely contributed to the growing list of local 
problems related to coal mining and coal-based pollution. Since 1948, the clout 
of the coal industry had been challenged by the implementation of new racially-
oriented land policies. It retained strength in places like Witbank where thou-
sands of land plots were owned by mining companies. In spite of state attempts at 
regulation and control, informal locations had amassed upon private mine com-
pany holdings, beyond the control of regional land policy makers. These loca-
tions were spread out around a relatively uncontained urban sprawl, interspersed 
with mining wasteland, pristine grassland, residential development and industrial 
sites.  
Local authorities, tasked with removing these locations and implementing the 
Group (Urban) Areas Act, had thus encountered numerous difficulties, to the 
annoyance of local farmers for whom private mine land already posed a threat. 
One disgruntled white farmer, Sgd. H.J. Stevens, wrote his complaints to the 
Department of Native Affairs in Pretoria.57 He was frustrated with the lack of 
regulation over mushrooming locations on privately owned land. He implored the 
state to take action, asking “why make a law if you have no control over it?”58 He 
had spent years trying to secure labour for his farm, to no avail. He could not 
compete with private land owners who charged workers far less for accommo-
dation on a so-called “private location”, as opposed to farm land.59 The relative 
autonomy of the mining industry in determining land use was demonstrated by 
this case. Local authorities had little control over the use of mine-owned terra 
firma – and even less control over the use of the carboniferous wealth that lay 
beneath the surface.  
Undermined land continued to restrain development in an expanding settle-
ment, and this was only further complicated by the implementation of Apartheid. 
Five decades of migrancy to and from the labour district had invariably led to a 
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more permanent state of African settlement, resulting in higher mortality rates in 
situ. Not only did this complicate the implementation of the Group Areas Act, 
but it raised the matter of establishing separate burial sites for this marginalized 
yet populous grouping. By mid-1955, the Witbank town council was adamant 
that no more municipal land be used for the burial of “deceased non-European 
employees” of the Witbank Colliery.60 The Witbank Colliery and regional Native 
Affairs Department were thus jointly tasked with resolving this gloomy problem. 
Under strict regulations of racial separation, the chosen site had to conform to 
“the stipulated distance of 1,000 yards” from “the nearest European dwelling”.61 
To further complicate matters, the responsible parties were forced to take into 
account the ensuing problem of undermined land. It would have been physically 
impossible to establish a burial site out of the subsided sections of the Witbank 
Colliery land holdings. Pollution was understood in racial terms, and served as a 
powerful metaphor around white fears of being ‘contaminated’ by Africans, in 
spite of both races living in the same ecologically polluted region.  
The difficult experience of establishing the cemetery clearly demonstrated the 
rigidity and deep inhumanity of racial separation in Witbank. It was also a 
revelation of the long-term effects of pillar robbing, which had destroyed the 
possibility of alternative use of the land after mining. By July, the Wolwekrans 
section of the company’s property was offered for burial purposes. It was “situ-
ated on ground which [had] not been undermined, and under which no mining 
[would] take place in the future”.62 The local Director of Native Labour wrote to 
the Chief Native Commissioner the following month, suggesting that one morgen 
of ground should be granted for every 1,000 burials “for every 20 years of 
estimated existence of the colliery”.63 The required distance of ‘1,000 yards’ 
from any ‘European dwelling’ could not be met – thus limiting options for both 
the municipality and the coal company. Witbank Colliery’s manager, G. Sowry, 
asked for this condition to be waived. He argued that “considerable difficulty 
would be experienced in selecting an alternative site on ground which (was) not 
undermined, or likely to be undermined in the future”.64 Eventually, a representa-
tive of the Peri-Urban Areas Health Board confirmed that the chosen site was 
“satisfactory from a health point of view and (was) not likely to detract from the 
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amenities of the neighbourhood”.65 The cemetery plan could thus go forward, as 
it was not in conflict with any town planning scheme or health by-laws.  
The growing demand for graveyards reflected the high level of mortality in 
post-war industrial Witbank. The region had transformed into an industrial 
network with a burgeoning population. The environmental impact of intensive 
industrial production, particularly coal consumption in the two power stations, 
was undeniable. It had the effect of exacerbating conditions of the lung, parti-
cularly tuberculosis, which had, by the time the war ended, become a national 
epidemic. Tuberculosis was later described as being the “product of socio-eco-
nomic conditions, poverty, over-crowding (and) malnutrition”.66 It has thus been 
termed a “social disease … intrinsically linked to industrialization”.67 According 
to Tremblay, it is the disease “most closely associated with World War II”.68 In 
Witbank this related to the arrival, en masse, of a migrant work force seeking 
employment in the coal mines and factories of the coalfield. The needs of the war 
had taken precedence, giving “no time” for the development of “housing schemes 
and social services generally, increas(ing) the problem to a very great extent”.69 
Witbank and its surrounding locations showed no exception in the presence of 
tuberculosis. The Southern Transvaal Tuberculosis Association, an early public 
health body, had complained in 1950 that there was “almost complete lack of 
facilities for the treatment of our tuberculosis (sic)”.70 This began to change in 
1952 with the establishment of the South African National Tuberculosis Asso-
ciation (SANTA) “as a result of the generosity of the public in response to an 
appeal for £1,000,000”.71 The formation of this early non-governmental body 
was the culmination of a form of loose networks of voluntary community-based 
organizations around the country.72 SANTA thus saw itself not only as a chari-
table public health organization, but as a “social movement in the field of 
health”.73 In practice, however, it mainly owed its origins to the work of volun-
teers in the Natal Anti-Tuberculosis Association.  
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The SANTA branch in Witbank was formed at a public meeting held on 
March 9th, 1955, with the election of Dr H.J.E. Schultz as the chairman. Its main 
goal was the establishment of a SANTA clinic for “non-Europeans” in order to 
“alleviate the serious local TB problem”.74 Progress was slow. Initial efforts saw 
the local Rotary Club of Witbank negotiating with SA Coal Estates and its 
principal, the Anglo American Corporation, to secure the compound buildings of 
their Schoongezicht Colliery. Despite cooperation from the industry, a permit for 
occupation from the Native Affairs Department and the Land Tenure Board was 
officially refused in 1957. A site was only found in 1958 when the municipality 
of Witbank offered the use of “suitable ground south of the Non-European 
hospital and a fresh application for a Group Areas Permit was made”.75 This 
permit was eventually granted the following year. The first patients were only 
admitted in November 1959. The new H.J.E. Schultz SANTA Centre no doubt 
brought comfort to many sufferers of tuberculosis, but it is possible to question 
the suitability of the ground granted by the municipality for use by non-Euro-
peans. The brown-brick building complex could be found on the left driving into 
Witbank, situated on the Ferro Metals Road. It was also adjacent to the barren 
site of the defunct Transvaal & Delagoa Bay Colliery.  
The hospital was a place of refuge for terminally ill patients, but this was 
compromised by its proximity to industry. Depending on weather conditions, 
smoke and airborne chemicals floated around the local atmosphere, often landing 
up in the airways of those who could least afford it.76 It soon became apparent 
that “you [couldn’t] put people near the … industries”.77 These areas were “full 
of dust … and this smoke [sic] … every night, after about six, seven o’ clock”.78 
Dust entering lungs infected by the bacilli of tuberculosis was relentless. None-
theless, the organization sought to affect positive change. The case of this 
hospice thus highlights the relationship between coal-based air pollution and 
tuberculosis, and begs the question of SANTA’s value in an area affected by 
severe air pollution. 
By the end of the decade, concerns over coal-based pollution had begun to 
infiltrate the local press. More information was provided about the dangers of 
mining to safety and wellbeing. In 1960, one local columnist went as far as 
asking his readers if they had  
ever seen anyone affected by carbon monoxide, the deadly gas given off from coal? … the 
real danger lies in it being so difficult to detect, for the gas is colourless, tasteless and 
odourless. Frequent symptoms are headache, weakness, nausea, paralysis of the nervous 
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system, and slowing down of pulse and respiration … in spite of numerous warnings that are 
issued each winter, it would be surprising to learn the exact number of non-Europeans … 
who perish through carbon monoxide poisoning.79  
The dangers of carbon monoxide had been well-known to industry insiders, 
and even workers, but it was only at this point that such discourse infiltrated the 
public arena. The problem continued to grow with the increasing rate of coal 
consumption. Generation of electricity had grown by 8 per cent per annum 
throughout the 1950s, and by 1963 this showed “no sign of slackening”.80 Escom 
constructed the Komati Power Station at this point, situated midway between 
Middelburg, Witbank and Bethal. It was lauded as the largest thermal station in 
Southern Africa at the time of its construction, with the completed station con-
suming coal at the rate of 10,000 tons per day.81 Despite the use of lower-grade 
‘duff’ coal in the process of consumption, dumps continued to grow throughout 
the district. Coal extraction retained a steady pace, but occasional contractions of 
demand resulted in the “heavy dumping of surplus duff coal”. Such a reduction 
in requirement took place from December 1961, and continued at least until 
1963.  
The low grade waste was prone to sporadic flaming. None of this was new to 
Witbankers, but the profusion of the dumps led to new concerns within a 
growing populace. The simultaneous growth of dumps and urban residence had 
the effect of radically altering perceptions of the dumps which had previously 
been taken for granted within the community. When children started using aban-
doned collieries as playgrounds, community members began to complain. The 
abandoned sites were tempting to children seeking unconventional revels in the 
disused shafts and unregulated coal mountains. One particular instance of this 
was in the Outspan area of Witbank, where children were “going down into the 
disused shafts and old workings” of the abandoned Tavistock Colliery in order to 
collect coal and play games like ‘hide and seek’: 
The danger of these children being buried in a ‘fall of earth’ or overcome by gases [was] 
ever present. Some of them join(ed) a couple of ladders together and descend(ed) into these 
old shafts, if one should slip from these ladders, there [was] no knowing what the result 
[would] be – perhaps death.82 
The abandoned coal dumps had become crucial sources of energy for cooking 
food and providing fuel for warmth for residents of the numerous locations 
excluded from Escom’s distribution of domestic electrification. A new vocal 
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group called for the prevention of a “disaster” by sealing off the shafts “somehow 
before it (was) too late”.83 
Both the coal industry and local municipality had, until then, disregarded the 
environmental effects of long-term coal-based pollution – with even less at-
tention given to the very real and physical dangers that existed at the surface. The 
Witbank Colliery soon started taking measures to “reduce the underground 
production of duff coal”, such that only 23,197 tons of saleable duff coal were 
dumped in 1964, as opposed to 63,164 tons in the previous year.84 Nonetheless, 
by the 1960s, the cumulative impact of coal-based pollution had irrefutably 
changed conceptions of the coal industry and its environmental legacy. Despite 
the incidence of innumerable environmental problems in Witbank, the most over-
whelming claim against the entire coal-based industrial complex at this point 
regarded the proliferation of atmospheric pollution.  
State, science and the question of pollution, 1961-1965 
Can any person living in this fair country of ours imagine what it will look like in fifty years 
hence … no, man’s imagination has not the scope to undertake a projection of such a vast 
scene of utter desolation.85  
Knowledge of atmospheric pollution, from coal and a host of other sources, had 
become more pronounced during the 1960s. Many felt that there was “no need to 
become panicky about air pollution” because South Africa’s climate still had “the 
space and the wind to swallow up or dissipate the mess that man (made) of his 
air”.86 On the other hand, the state had now recognized that action was needed 
unless authorities wanted to “wake up in smog one day and have to spend 
millions cleaning it up”.87 Momentum had already been generated in the mid-
1950s with the appointment of a special committee to research atmospheric 
pollution. The consequent formation of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Bill (APPB) had been a continuation of a 
select committee of parliament unable to complete its work by the end of the 
parliamentary session. Its work was largely driven by the work of the CSIR, 
which had lobbied with urgency for a “technical investigation of certain specific 
aspects of air pollution in South Africa”.88 This national study would involve an 
assessment of “the technical and economic implications of the use of alternates to 
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bituminous coal from the point of view of smoke production”.89 More particular 
to Witbank, the study would explore the “question of the diffusion of pol-
lution”.90 This would require significant investment. An estimated £15 000 would 
be required in the first year. Funding would be sourced from the CSIR, urban 
local authorities affected by pollution, as well as the state. Many felt that it would 
be “more equitable” if the research was mostly funded by the state.91  
International pressure to tackle the problem of atmospheric pollution had led 
to the formation of multi-national groupings such as the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) Meeting of Experts on Air Pollution, the United Nations for the 
Fight against Noise and Smog (NANS) and the Congress of Nations “for the 
fight against pollution of the atmosphere caused by exhaust gases of motorized 
vehicles”.92 Emphasis was placed on the cumulative emission of pollutants; coal-
based air pollution was merely one of many. Hence, the numerous meetings of 
the Commission of Inquiry had included debates around the relative gravity of 
particular sources of pollution. The inclusion of a wide variety of public consti-
tuents in debates thus illuminated the perpetually changing, and often conflictual, 
conceptions of pollution.  
Minutes of a meeting regarding ‘Evidence from the Select Committee on the 
Subject of APPB’ that took place in March 1961 was revealing in this regard. 
Halliday had argued that air pollution mainly took the form of smoke, “caused by 
a large number of things, but mostly by the incomplete burning of coal”.93 He 
thus implored that this faulty combustive process be remedied through greater 
efficiency; sufficient exposure to oxygen and high temperature would facilitate 
the full combustion of fuel. The only remnant would be “hot air, carbon dioxide 
and sulphur dioxide”.94 According to this prominent CSIR scientist, the relative 
danger of smoke diffusion could thus be accorded “on the basis of its 
blackness”.95 He cited “a large amount of research” that “demonstrated that the 
blackness of smoke (had) a direct relation to the total quantity of materials going 
up the stack”.96 On this basis, Halliday defended the clause of the APPB which 
gave local authorities the power to create by-laws to deal with smoke. These by-
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laws would thus impose restrictions for the emission of smoke “of above a 
certain blackness for limited periods only”.97 Halliday’s specification that smoke 
control would take place for limited periods reflected the weighty influence of 
industry in drawing up the legislation. Even this internationally renowned 
authority on the prevention and control of pollution was willing to accede that 
total smoke prevention was impossible since “any factory or furnace or boiler 
burning coal must, from time to time, have the ash removed and when this (was) 
done, you cannot avoid making smoke”.98 The production of dark, undulating 
smoke in routine industrial processes was inexorable within the confines of 
affordable technology. The Commission of Inquiry had been adamant that in the 
promulgation of the bill, control would be “secured by agreement rather than 
compulsion”.99 Most important was to show that atmospheric pollution could be 
controlled in the “selected areas … and that the cost of such control (would) not 
cripple industry or the local authority”.100 This would necessitate the cooperation 
of state, provincial and local authorities and various industrial role players. 
The work of the Commission of Inquiry into the APPB was groundbreaking, 
but did not resolve the entire problem of atmospheric pollution. When, during the 
March gathering, Halliday was asked for his opinion “on gases coming from 
motor car exhausts being a cause of cancer”, his “position here [was] similar to 
that of dust from mine dumps”:  
The National Committee did not attempt to deal with it because it did not know of any tech-
nical solution.101 
Halliday’s response was terse, reflecting certain limitations in the drafting of 
the APPB. The drafting of the APPB was, in fact, complicated by stiff debates 
around this limited span of legal recourse around pollution. It had remained 
unclear which source of pollution made the most severe contribution to 
atmospheric pollution. As emphasized by Halliday, the scope of the Bill was thus 
limited to restrictions and guidelines for which a known technical remedy could 
be found. There was no doubt that the combustion of coal was a main contributor 
– it had topped the list of the 1948 Report of the Departmental Committee of 
Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies – but 
the scope of the problem of air pollution had expanded.  
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Two other main sources of atmospheric pollution had included diesel-based 
exhaust fumes from motor vehicles and dust from mine dumps. The dialogue 
facilitated by the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry had brought these 
problems to the surface. The growth of consciousness around the relationship 
between environmental degradation and public health had already been revealed 
in the formation of SANTA. This organization focused on tuberculosis, which 
was directly affected by atmospheric pollution. More revealing of responses to 
changing conceptions of pollution was the formation of the Anti-Diesel Pollution 
Society in Mayville, Natal.102 The organization aimed at raising awareness of the 
dangers of diesel, specifically its relationship to lung cancer. This organization 
was well represented at meetings of the Commission of Enquiry. It emphasized 
the “very strong evidence” that revealed that the diesel engine was harmful to 
health and argued that it was “not good enough” to pollute the air which South 
Africans had “no choice but to breathe”.103 It was obvious to the organization that 
an urgent “adjustment” to popular conceptions of diesel use was necessary.104 In 
a pamphlet written by G.C. Myddelton entitled ‘Diesel Fumes and Lung Cancer’ 
he argued against the mainstream view still held that saw little merit in existing 
scientific or medical evidence connecting diesel fumes and lung disease.105 The 
pamphlet had been written in response to a statement made by Dr P.J. Lawther, 
Director of the Medical Research Council Group for Research on Atmospheric 
Pollution, who had publicly denigrated the “many ill informed attempts to 
incriminate the diesel engine” which, in his opinion, did not “merit serious 
discussion”.106 Myddelton argued that the “possible connection between diesel 
fumes and lung cancer certainly merit(ed) serious consideration”.107 The Anti-
Diesel Pollution Society was thus pivotal in reshaping the way atmospheric 
pollution was conceived.  
New knowledge presented by this group included expanding the scope of 
understanding of air pollution – which had previously only been “equated with 
smoke … which (was) obvious to the eye”.108 This association was thus revealed 
to be entirely misleading since “all sorts of gases and vapours, many of them 
irritant and harmful, (were) completely invisible and exist(ed) quite apart from 
smoke”.109 One set of carcinogenic chemical constituents included the full vari-
ety of “aromatic polycyclic hydrocarbons”, the most “famous” and “notorious” 
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being benzpyrene.110 The measurement of benzpyrene was, in fact, used as a 
“guide to the degree of general polycyclic hydrocarbon pollution”.111 At this 
stage, the national incidence of lung cancer had risen dramatically, but no single 
cause of the disease had been “scientifically demonstrated”.112 He felt that “every 
possible factor should be investigated”.113 Myddelton was adamant that adhering 
to the theory that there was only one cause was obscuring the fact that there may 
be other, and far more powerful, causes of lung cancer.  
Conceptions of pollution had become far reaching; coal-based pollution was 
now seen to be central, but not singularly important, in the production of at-
mospheric pollution. Numerous amenities of modern living, including the pro-
duction of electricity, tobacco and motor vehicles, were now being connected to 
the introduction of powerful carcinogens into the atmosphere – but without 
definitive proof these remained largely unregulated. Such questions certainly had 
the effect of expanding the scope of understanding of pollution and its dire 
repercussions. Despite this, mining remained the major source of pollution, with 
broad representation in the discussion of the Commission of Enquiry.  
The Commission was riddled with opposing viewpoints on the source of pol-
lution and its links to both environmental and health problems. Some members 
were more radical than others. Mr R. Mitchell, the town engineer of the Springs 
Municipality, was extremely outspoken about the dust problem from mine 
dumps.114 He criticized the fact that the dumps had not even warranted enough 
attention to be considered a problem, “so much as being merely a nuisance”.115 
Mitchell also corrected the misconception that mine dump dust was a “local 
problem”.116 He unequivocally regarded this as a national problem, covering “the 
Witwatersrand proper, the Western Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal from 
Springs to Kinross and part of the Free State”.117 This certainly did not fit the 
description of ‘local.’ He went on to argue that there were “more towns in South 
Africa affected by dust from slimes dams at present, than there (were) towns with 
a smoke problem”.118 The situation was simply getting worse with time, and 
would continue to degenerate to such a degree that  
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in 40 or 50 years it [would] probably be impossible to live in the area … it is not the same as 
with other forms of atmospheric pollution where pollution stops when the agency producing 
it closes down … the reverse [was] rather true, because the real problem [was] created after a 
mine [had] ceased to function … the slimes dams and mine dumps steadily erode as time 
goes on and as rain and weather conditions break up the hard crust at the surface, so thick 
layers of dust become thicker and thicker. All dumps go through this process although they 
may differ as to the composition of the material.119  
Mitchell’s description was certainly true of the mine dumps circling the town 
and vicinity of Witbank. He went a step further by arguing that this constituted a 
“far more urgent problem than that created by smoke”.120 Dust was “more 
intensive and destructive”.121 His message was urgent, in that there was a  
limit to the time within which such measures should be applied namely before a mine is 
closed down. Otherwise, who is to be held responsible for such measures after the mine has 
closed down and who is going to finance them?122  
Mitchell’s argument must have frustrated the core group of the Commission of 
Inquiry, who were already tasked with a massive set of concerns in tackling coal-
based atmospheric pollution. Despite his renegade attitude and incisive critique, 
Mitchell fell in line when it came to the role of the mining industry. He deferred 
to this sector by specifying that “he did not want to be interpreted … as being 
unfairly critical of the mining companies”.123 He even defended the damage 
already done by the industry by arguing that the pollution by the mid 1960s had 
not been anticipated by them. The dust problem had only started “when dumps 
were abandoned”.124  
The Air Pollution Prevention Bill was approved by the Minister of Health on 
August 6, 1963. Copies were printed in both official languages and made avail-
able to individuals and organizations to give time for comments on the Com-
mission’s recommendations before the draft legislation was introduced to par-
liament. By 1965, the Minister of Health announced the promulgation of the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA). Its central objective was the con-
trol and amelioration of the “health and amenity implications of air pollution”.125 
The administrative powers of the APPA would be vested in the Ministry of 
Health. Much of the work related to the implementation of the Act was of an 
“engineering or a chemical engineering nature, or else … mechanical and com-
bustion engineering”.126 Thus, a National Air Pollution Advisory Committee was 
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established to assist the Department of Health with technical information and 
advice. The Act in effect empowered the Minister of Health to take action over 
atmospheric pollution by declaring any area to be a ‘controlled’ site in terms of 
the Act.  
The human cost of the coal mining industry  
Nobody will deny that … the air is rotten … they say you don’t have to smoke in Witbank, 
you just walk outside and take a … deep breathe.127  
The 1950s and 1960s saw tremendous changes in the way pollution was under-
stood. Both social and scientific connections were being made around the nume-
rous environmental and health implications of ongoing uncontrolled atmospheric 
pollution. Air pollution was affecting the health of the environment, with in-
delible implications to the health and general well-being of off-mine commu-
nities windswept by the dust and particulates released in the process of industry. 
Often, these effects were indistinguishable. Throughout the Witbank coalfield, 
this was felt in terms of the health and general quality of living of those nearby 
active or underground mines, smoke stacks of power stations, dust-blown coal 
dumps and industrial sites.  
Malcolm Suttill, an English engineer for whom Witbank had recently become 
home through his recruitment by Anglo’s subsidiary, Highveld Steel & Vana-
dium, remembered his initial arrival in the area in mid 1968. His first winter was 
spent in the single compound accommodation made available for professional 
industrialists looking to permanently settle in the town. He vividly recalled the 
misery of regular invasions of black, gritty dust blowing out of the smoke stack 
of the Witbank power station. This power station had closed by the time of his 
arrival, “but the tip was totally open”.128 His single quarters were quite close to it: 
in windy weather I mean there was all-sorts blowing off this … ash tip … horrible … and 
that continued for a lot of years before they seemed to get some good grass on it and then 
they, they got rid of most of it and um … it was horrible, it used to blow all over the place . I 
can remember that (it) was so cold when the wind blew in and seeing the wind blowing and 
then blowing this ash up as well … it was pretty horrible living anywhere near that thing at 
the time … yes, that was bad.129 
Suttill and his family had joined a wave of English technical experts and 
miners who settled in the town during this time. He recalled that they were “quite 
concerned about the health of (their) children”.130 Lungs in small children were 
more prone to damage as they were not yet fully formed. Inhalation of excessive 
dust and smoke was particularly unhealthy for this age group. He recalled that 
                                                 
127  Interview with Le Clus Taute, Goedehoop Colliery, Mpumalanga, June 5, 2008. 
128  Interview with Malcolm Suttill, Witbank, June 3, 2008. 
129  Ibid.  
130  Ibid.  
75 
  
bronchitis, asthma and other lung-related ailments were “a bit of an issue”.131 His 
diminution of the gravity of the health implications echoed E.C. Halliday’s 
curious hesitation in proclaiming a clear link between pollution and lung disease. 
During one discussion, he had been asked by a member of the Commission of 
Inquiry whether he thought that “pollution of the air adversely affect(ed) health 
to such an extent as to justify the introduction of machinery for the control of 
industries”. In response to this, Halliday had argued that  
the cautious attitude to adapt towards air pollution would be to say that it constitutes a 
hindrance to good health … generally, when a person is ill, pollution of the air prevents him 
from getting well easily because there is no doubt that air pollution restricts breathing, 
although less with some persons than with others.132  
Proclamations made by scientists and health experts were not based on 
exhaustive research. In fact, very little research had been conducted outside of 
the realm of occupational health – particularly in relation to environmental ex-
posure. The question of absolute knowledge had become significant in estab-
lishing the relationship between air pollution and respiratory disease. Any level 
of doubt made it difficult for advocacy groups to isolate blame to any of the 
‘scheduled industries’, including energy, steel and mining. In May, 1965, the 
Star published a letter from H. Nelson, a Medical Officer of Health. This formed 
part of a cautionary discourse around polluted air and its ramifications. While he 
was aware of its possible effect on young children, very little was known “about 
what effect it (could) have on the unborn child”.133 Most pre-natal deaths 
observed by him were “due to prematurity and atelectasis of the lungs”, but he 
was “quite unaware of polluted air being the cause of either of these”.134 The 
limited conception of air pollution was clearly linked to a lack of knowledge. 
Without being equipped with medico-scientific proof of the relationship between 
air pollution and coal mining, little could be done, and Witbank continued to 
change. Ignorant of the long-term health effects of smoke exposure, and largely 
reliant on an industrial economy, the majority of the local population was forced 
to tolerate the unpleasantness of the smoggy town. Two companies cited were 
Rand Carbide and Cyanamid. One of the complaints leveled at Cyanamid was  
not about the smoke so much … we used to get what we called tomcat smell … they were 
making cyanide for one thing. They were making some of the products going into pharma-
ceuticals as well, from sort of carbon and nitrogen type products … and um, and some of that 
stuff … was … some of the early antibiotics … they were burning off some of their rubbish 
all the time. It was a constant thing … it was horrible … that was really, really bad pollution 
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… people wanted to move it was so bad and they wouldn’t own up to it and we all got it … 
whenever the wind came in our direction it was horrible … we didn’t think that was 
detrimental to health … (although) it was affecting our standard of living … it was that 
nasty.135 (my italics) 
The APPA set a new precedent for environmental regulation, forcing indus-
tries to measure their levels of air pollution. However, it was not simply the 
smoke from a single industry that needed to be halted. Pollution in Witbank came 
with a myriad of sources. The strength of the APPA was limited in dealing with 
the full impact of pollution. It would remain difficult to relieve the grumblings of 
local residents complaining over the aesthetic and olfactory pollution of their air. 
Conclusion 
In the decades following the Second World War, conceptions of coal-based pol-
lution had changed beyond recognition. Local and global experiences of acute 
pollution during the 1950s had raised awareness and fortified the call for research 
around atmospheric pollution and water conservation, as well as the implementa-
tion of systems of control. In many instances, research involved merely citing the 
appearance of industrial towns such as Witbank, which not only produced at least 
half of the nation’s coal, but also hosted the majority of its conversion into 
electric power. Witbank also hosted other industries, creating an amalgam of 
smells and fogs which covered the town. Despite the fact that pollution had been 
decisively conceived as something to be dealt with by the state, measures re-
mained restricted by the economic and political prioritization of coal mining and 
industrial production. The following chapter will evaluate how far legislation 
promulgated in the mid-1960s was implemented, and how these policies mani-
fested within the pre-existing industrialized ecology of the Witbank coalfield. 
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5 
Adapting to change:  
Conceptions of pollution  
in Witbank, 1965-1978  
Introduction 
“I am sure we can adapt to the dirt, pollution and noise … but that is the real tragedy – we 
can adapt to it.”1 
By 1965, the steady expansion of heavy industry, particularly the establishment 
of Highveld Steel and Vanadium in the town compounded environmental prob-
lems in the town and surrounding veld land. After two decades of debate over the 
scope of its mandate, the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA), South 
Africa’s first major legislation on pollution, was finally passed. Monitoring the 
prevention of pollution became a competency of the mining department of the 
state, but this did little to change the gravity of coal-based pollution. As a result 
of growing international interest, the opening of Richard’s Bay Coal Terminal 
and the introduction of open cast mining methods, coal production had grown 
exponentially by the late 1970s. Pollution was now no longer ignored by the state 
– but economic growth made it impossible to prevent. Responses of government, 
industry and civil society stakeholders to new protective legislation such as the 
APPA and the amended Water Act of 1966 reflected new conceptions of 
pollution and highlighted the need for new ways of monitoring pollution. This 
chapter addresses the effects of these new conceptions on Witbank between 1965 
and 1978, when the Witbank coal industry was swung in a new direction by the 
successful implementation of opencast mining methods in the region.  
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Responding to the APPA, 1965-1968  
The implementation of the APPA changed the nature of legal control over the 
environment. Local and national authorities became regulatory bodies for the 
control of air pollution. Disciplinary measures were set in place for contravention 
of APPA regulations. This included, on first conviction, a fine not exceeding 
R200, or a prison term not exceeding six months. A second conviction resulted in 
a fine not exceeding R1,000, or up to one year of imprisonment.2 The Act thus 
recognized and reconceived the liability of industry for pollution they had 
created. Despite this breakthrough, some of its terms remained vague, reflecting 
certain difficulties in implementation.  
In terms of monitoring private industry, the APPA relied on the ability – or the 
capacity – of local authorities to enforce control measures, and punishments were 
rarely meted out. According to Sections 14(1) and (11) the Minister of Health 
was empowered to grant local authorities jurisdiction to control atmospheric 
pollution by smoke.3 This would include the right to “enter upon premises and to 
inspect fuel burning appliances”.4 Action against coal-based smoke pollution 
could be taken at four levels, including making use of powers without promul-
gating regulations; promulgating only one or two regulations; promulgating a 
considerable number of regulations – and promulgating regulations and establish-
ing a “smoke control zone”.5 Lack of clarity over defining what level of pollution 
was ‘reasonably practicable’ led to conflict of interest between various stake-
holders. 
In Witbank, the ability of the local authority to ameliorate smoke conditions 
was obstructed by the fact that power stations had been added to the “schedule of 
noxious industries”.6 This meant that they came under the control of the Chief 
Officer and not the local authority. Smoke officials were thus required to report 
concerns to the Chief Officer who would then deal with the power station. This 
was conceived as helping the local smoke official, supposedly relieving him of 
the burden of dealing with factory owners.7  
The state was now responsible for the adequate implementation of air pol-
lution prevention methods of scheduled industries. Understanding of pollution 
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was now guided by definitions laid out in the APPA – particularly relating to the 
definition of ‘scheduled industries’ subject to government control. The establish-
ment of the National Air Pollution Advisory Committee was seen as a crucial 
component for effective policy implementation. Gradual implementation of the 
APPA was seen as the most effective way of adapting to shifting environmental 
conditions. The implementation of the Act was thus guided by a principle of 
tiered application. Explaining the strategy behind the ‘gentle’ process, E.C. Hal-
liday argued that  
as time goes by the situation cannot get better, it must get worse … if you pass an Act and 
you start taking advantage of the Act, you can do it gently; you don’t have to be so severe as 
you would have to be if you had to control and try to reduce smoke nuisance at a stage where 
the smoke concentration had become worse, where you had to have a very much more 
violent reaction and be very much harder on the general public.8  
One of the first tasks of the newly formed National Air Pollution Advisory 
Committee was to standardize maximum smoke density.9 It was thus necessary to 
develop a “prescribed instrument for measuring and comparing … smoke emis-
sion with the standard”.10 Without this, “any enforcement action would be based 
on personal opinion”.11 Critics challenged the methods used to measure the 
density of smoke based on the imprecision of the method. The scientific basis for 
determining reasonable maximum smoke density was that smoke emissions 
could not appear to be “of a shade equal to or darker” than the second shade on 
Ringelman’s Chart.12 This chart was one of a number of rudimentary methods 
specifically developed “to determine whether smoke emissions (were) excessive 
or not”.13 The chart was held in position by a first person at an “appropriate 
distance” from the second person, who acted as the observer. The chart, 
representing different shades of grey, would then be held “so that the top of the 
stack appear(ed) over the edge of the chart so that the observer (could) compare 
the blackness of the smoke with that of the squares on the chart”.14 A second 
method involved optical instruments, and was known as the “miniature smoke 
chart”.15 The small monocular instrument was aimed at the top of the chimney or 
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smoke stack.16 The images would then be adjusted so that the filters could be 
seen with an image of the smoke in the clear space beside them. This made it 
possible to compare the darkness on the chart with the darkness of the smoke. 
Testing did not take into account smoke emitted during the start-up or overhaul 
of a fuel burning appliance, as well as any breakdown or unforeseen disturbance 
of factory appliances. These diminished the efficiency of the process of deter-
mining permitted maximum smoke density.17  
The lack of general expertise in the field of smoke and general pollution con-
trol was a latent burden for the implementation of the APPA. In a 1966 national 
circular from the Department of Health to all competent local authorities, the 
“real problem” was seen as being the lack of experienced personnel.18 Even when 
the operator of the boiler causing unduly black smoke emissions was requested to 
comply, “considerable difficulty” was often encountered within the factory or 
power station.19 The Department of Health thus recommended to local authorities 
that owing to a lack of technical skills, “purely legal action, such as sending a 
demand to the owner, (was) not likely to have the required effect”.20 The owner, 
suddenly forced into a system of smoke control, was, in any case, unlikely to be 
equipped. The employment of a smoke control officer within larger local authori-
ties with more sophisticated industries was seen as “indispensable”.21 The local 
authority had a right to say whether or not an industry could build a factory on a 
certain site – if they allowed it they could “cause their own area of jurisdiction 
more or less trouble”.22 Hence, additional technical staff with genuine expertise 
in pollution mitigation and prevention was highly recommended. Despite this, 
Halliday advocated a policy of compromise and settlement, arguing that  
the important thing (was) if possible not to get to the Court Case … it means you’ve failed. 
An Inspector who gets to that stage has lost his friendship and now has got a real enemy and 
is in big trouble. If you can persuade, push or encourage the industrialist to reduce his smoke 
output without a Court order, he is doing very much better.23 
The APPA was thus “not designed to make a sudden change”.24 This placed 
pressure on local authorities who were urged to get “experience” with small 
                                                 
16  Ibid. A monocular is a magnifying glass device for use through only one eye.   
17  Ibid.   
18  Ibid.  
19  Ibid.  
20  NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Circular (No 21 of 1966) from Department of Health to All Local Authorities in 
the Republic, re: ‘Four Levels at which Local Authorities could operate Part III of the APPA’, 
December 22, 1966. 
21  Ibid.  
22  NASA, TRB/2/4/93 E.C. Halliday, Address on air pollution prevention, Walmer Town Hall, March 
10, 1967. 
23  Ibid.  
24  Ibid.  
81 
  
concerns before trying to declare smoke control zones.25 In Witbank, the void of 
environmental control measures in the town was made more explicit, as were the 
financial implications of implementing such controls. The difficulty of enforcing 
legislation was compounded by a number of factors, including the strength of the 
industry, South Africa’s ongoing reliance on coal as a staple source of energy, 
and the scientific uncertainty around defining ‘reasonably practicable’ methods 
of pollution reduction.26  
The mandate of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act of 1965 gave power 
over only certain industries designated as ‘scheduled.’ One major critique of the 
Act was the way in which it conceived industry: ‘scheduled’ industry was 
generally understood to be “carrying out certain processes … mostly producing 
strategic materials which involve(d) a certain amount of secrecy”.27 Such pre-
scriptions made monitoring and reducing smoke emissions difficult.  
Responsibility for air pollution from other sources, including non-scheduled 
industries, still fell upon local authorities, who also had to control domestic 
smoke and diesel exhaust fumes. In a letter to the Parliamentary Secretary of the 
Department of Health concerning the definition of ‘noxious and offensive gases’ 
to be included in the Act, Halliday argued that it was beyond practicability to 
include “all the different gases the health officials wish(ed) to put in”.28 For the 
purposes of the APPA, the proposed definition included a host of substances, 
when in gaseous form, including “hydrocarbons, organic nitrogen sulphur or 
halogen compound, beryllium, chromium, mercury, varidium [and] dust from 
asbestos processing”.29 Prevention was understood in relation to the ‘best prac-
ticable means’ that could be taken to abate pollution.  
This policy had been successfully followed in Britain, setting a useful 
precedent for South Africa. Item 15 of Part 2 of the APPA declared that no fuel 
burning appliance was to be installed “in or on any premises” unless it was 
“reasonably practicable” that the appliance could be “operated simultaneously 
without emitting dark smoke or smoke of a colour darker than may be prescribed 
regulation”.30 Part IV related to dust control, whereby relevant authorities would 
“take the prescribed steps or (where no steps ha(d) been prescribed) adopt the 
best practicable means for preventing such dust from becoming so dispersed or 
causing such nuisance”.31 This even applied to the height of chimneys and smoke 
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stacks, which were to be “as far as practicable … sufficient to prevent smoke or 
any other product of combustion from becoming prejudicial to health or a nui-
sance to occupiers of premises in the surrounding areas”.32 Following the ‘best 
practicable means’ ultimately meant demonstrating to the inspectorate of the 
Department of Health that “taking into consideration the technological remedies 
available, local conditions and the company’s financial position, it (was) doing 
the best it (could) to abate pollution”.33 This also meant refining budgets to 
include the cost of environmental fallout.  
E.C. Halliday, architect of the APPA, had anticipated resistance from the 
mining industry over the added cost of controlling smoke pollution.34 He argued 
firmly that members of the National Air Pollution Advisory Committee should 
not represent any “particular industrial group” as this would create “some degree 
of compulsion to support their ‘constituency’”.35 It would thus be the job of the 
non-technical members of the national air pollution prevention task force to 
tackle resistance from this influential sector, forcing them to adapt to new 
regulations.  
Communication between state and industry representatives was crucial at this 
point in order to comply with new industry standards. These challenges were 
reflected in correspondence between the Department of Health and the Collieries 
Committee of the Chamber of Mines in June 1965, whose interest was founded 
on the effect that the APPA provisions would have on the coal industry, parti-
cularly Witbank, where  
the control of air pollution [was] recognized by all responsible persons and bodies as 
desirable … at the same time, it present(ed) difficult problems which [could] best be solved 
with the cooperation and goodwill of all interested parties.36  
The Collieries Committee emphasized the importance of ongoing coal pro-
duction, being the “only indigenous source of fuel in the Republic”, supplying 90 
per cent of national fuel needs.37 Since most large industrial users were able to 
comply with smokeless combustion techniques, such users were not regarded as 
an obstacle.38  
The blame for ongoing smoke emission was levelled at “small industrial con-
cerns” – and most of all with domestic users, whose total combined coal con-
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sumption was 4.8 million tons, equal to around ten percent of the annual national 
tonnage of fuel consumed each year.39  
As a cheap staple fuel source, coal was popular for heat and energy in 
segregated African townships throughout South Africa. This included the loca-
tions surrounding Witbank, which would “completely disappear under smoke” 
during the dry barren winter months of the Highveld.40 With almost no invest-
ment in infrastructural development of these locations, it was difficult for the 
state to enforce pollution control measures, or even to switch to electricity or gas, 
such that even local authorities had “given up this idea”.41 This environmental 
racism was plainly accepted by the Act, revealing the partiality of the its scope. 
This meant that there was no “nice solution” for controlling such pollution.42  
Witbank in the ‘pollution game’, 1971-1978 
In Witbank, energy production was still the backbone of the town’s local eco-
nomy. The APPA now required each municipality to “ensure the burning of solid 
fuel smokelessly in all Municipal undertakings”.43 It also placed pressure on the 
Witbank municipality to assert control over emissions. Debates arose over 
whether it was possible to replace, or at least supplement, coal consumption with 
an alternative solid smokeless fuel. The financial burden was emphasized by the 
Collieries Committee of the Chamber of Mines. It argued that the minimum 
production cost of such a shift would be R4 per ton over and above the cost of 
the coal which it would replace. This would thus involve consumers in a mini-
mum additional cost of nearly R20 million per annum.44 Considering local re-
liance on the coal industry, the Committee felt that this would be catastrophic for 
the local economy.  
The use of anthracite, a hard, solid combustible fossil fuel, was thus advocated 
by the South African Anthracite Producers Association. A pamphlet produced by 
this association soon after the APPA was passed, explored the benefits of burning 
anthracite, a harder version of coal. Compared to bituminous coal, anthracite was 
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relatively free of impurities, making consumption more efficient. Anthracite 
usually burned evenly, making it necessary to refuel only every twelve hours. 
Anthracite could thus be “relied upon … at whatever time during the day or 
night”.45 Replacing coal with carbon-rich staples such as anthracite threatened 
the relative monopoly of the coal industry over a rapidly growing energy sector. 
The best way to minimise Witbank’s coal-based pollution would be to develop 
mechanisms which enabled smokeless consumption.46 
Comparisons between the quality of South African carbon-based fossil fuel 
and more mature coal industries in the United Kingdom and Europe were 
common. South African anthracite, mined from the Vryheid region of Northern 
Natal, was compared to “Welsh Dry Steam Coal”.47 Such parallels were not 
restricted to the quality of coal, but also extended to popular perceptions of 
environmental dangers and hazards. Mature in age and experience, the British 
industry had placed “a lot more attention to the environment earlier”, and 
Witbank’s imported skilled personnel were usually familiar with the “pollution 
game”.48 This included hired officials of the local Highveld Steel and Vanadium 
factory. With its patented synthesis of iron and vanadium to produce reinforced 
steel, Witbank’s Highveld Steel and Vanadium was, in many ways, a strong can-
didate for environmental control by the APPA. Employing hundreds by the late 
1960s, it represented a significant growth trend for local industry.  
The process at Highveld was unique: vanadium would be used to make beams 
smaller, with the same strength.49 As a subsidiary of Anglo American, Highveld 
was expected to maintain international industry standards related to controlling 
pollution. Within the company, there existed a “bit of grumble … about looking 
after the environment”, but it was never considered to pose a threat or “major 
situation”.50 By 1967, there was little question of the significance of the Air Pol-
lution Research Group, a state-subsidized trust set up to support the implementa-
tion of the APPA. The centrality of the CSIR in the continued control and man-
agement of the fund was underscored at the sixth general meeting of the body in 
October of that year, where the CSIR sought to obtain inclusion of the basic 
budget of the Air Pollution Research Group in the general parliament grant made 
to the CSIR. N. Stutterheim, vice president of the CSIR, argued for this move 
based on the fact that the “group (was) now largely supported by the CSIR out of 
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other revenue”.51 A request was thus made to dissolve the Standing Committee of 
Contributors to the Air Pollution Research Fund to facilitate incorporation into 
the CSIR. The financial report of the Air Pollution Research Group (APRG) of 
the CSIR for the second quarter of 1967, specifically April until July, reflected 
that the CSIR contribution of R4,943 was more than the combined contribution 
of R4,870 from external bodies.52 The APRG budget for 1968-1969 projected 
more than R30,550 coming from the CSIR contribution.53 The CSIR argued for 
greater control over the work of the APRG; in any case, the onus fell on them.54 
Another active body was the Solid Fuels Advisory Bureau, which held a con-
ference in Johannesburg in February, 1968, to assist municipalities with the 
practical application of the APPA.55 This featured a range of speakers, including 
the Medical Officer of Health from Johannesburg, the Director of Environmental 
Sciences Library of the Chamber of Mines, an economist from Wits University, 
industrial representatives, as well as two Air Pollution Control Officers, and even 
a number of delegates from the Witbank municipality.56 Chaired by E.C. Halli-
day, the proceedings revealed shifting conceptions of the relationship between 
pollution and public health, the economic cost to South Africa and to the con-
sumer, as well as effective use of the APPA. It also covered new techniques in 
combustion and gasification, as well as ways in which to establish and operate an 
industrial environmental control section. The seminar ended off with a workshop 
on how to measure pollution, what levels of control to use, when and how to 
implement such controls, approving appliances and effectively using smoke 
indicators such as the Ringelman Chart.57 Symposiums also targeted specific 
industries, including one held in August, 1968, for the South African Institute of 
Foundrymen.58 This symposium was appropriately technical in nature, dealing 
with the control of gaseous emissions from iron and steel foundries, assessment 
of dust and fume inside factories and foundries, evaluating the value of fabric 
filter dust collectors, as well as understanding foundries in relation to dust dis-
eases. The initiative brought together speakers from the Air Pollution Research 
Group, under E.C. Halliday. Concerns over the relationship between smoke and 
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lung disease were presented by Dr J. Webster, head of the national Pneumo-
coniosis Research Unit.  
Such visible interventions by the CSIR dramatically changed the way coal-
based pollution in Witbank was understood, but this did little to dispel the idea 
that achieving an APPA clearance certificate was “nothing more than a license to 
pollute”.59 Another general shortcoming was that no set standards had been laid 
down, so that the “sole arbiter of whether a factory is applying ‘the best 
practicable means’ [was] the chief officer of the Industrial Hygiene Division of 
the Department of Health”.60 Without laid-out standards, the credibility of the 
APPA was undermined, “so it [was] purely a rule of thumb decision by one 
man”.61 With only five inspectors to control 745 industries operating more than 
1000 scheduled processes, “it [was] inevitable they [were] overworked”.62 In 
addition, inspectors conceived of themselves as “advisors … first and foremost, 
[so] they tend(ed) to get pretty pally with polluters and address(ed) them by their 
first names”.63  
Such shortcomings paved the way for an independent air pollution lobby from 
the civil sector, which was visibly active by 1968. By March an action committee 
was formed to establish an environmental non-governmental organisation to fight 
against atmospheric pollution. The chairman of the committee, J.L. Easterbrook, 
argued that the proposed ‘Clean Air Society’ would provide a forum for “airing 
differences of opinion between controllers and controlled”.64 It would also ensure 
that industries, organisations and the general public were “equipped to speak 
publicly when it was necessary that a lead should be given to public thinking”.65 
After all, the existence of environmental legislation certainly did not mean that 
pollution would be “simply removed”.66 Such an association would, in fact, 
benefit industry, providing a “channel” to facilitate the implementation of air 
pollution control. The Clean Air Society would serve as a “buffer” between 
government authorities and scheduled industries who feared making direct en-
quiries “lest unfavourable attention be directed to their activities”.67  
Opposition to the formation of such a group came from the Coal Bureau and 
the Air Pollution Research Group, who felt that the Clean Air Society was 
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redundant. Countering such claims, Easterbrook argued that the society provided 
a unique opportunity for communication between stakeholders. Easterbrook re-
ferred to Witbank’s immense problems of pollution, specifically the outlying 
residential zone of Clewer which formed part of the local municipality. Here, 
local air pollution had become a matter of serious concern. Clewer’s natural 
water resources were already compromised, particularly the water mine pollution 
of the Brugspruit stream before it entered the Olifants River destined to the 
Loskop Dam. With the arrival of numerous factories in the vicinity of the district 
by the late 1960s, pre-existing conditions of pollution in the area already affected 
began to spiral.68 Community representatives, namely the regional secretary of 
the Clean Air Society, were adamant that “grave measures should be adopted as a 
requirement”.69 South Africa’s Chief Medical Officer had even committed to 
investigating Clewer’s air pollution problem and to take measures to resolve the 
problem.  
This pressure from the civil sector forced the Transvaal Board for the Devel-
opment of Peri-urban Areas to investigate the issue. Upon closer inspection, the 
Board found that the major local polluter was Highveld Steel and Vanadium, 
close to Clewer on the northern side of Witbank. This industrial enterprise 
periodically emitted smoke which looked like “red smoke clouds”.70 The proper-
ties of the smoke were harmful, raising concerns over the poison gases contained 
in Highveld’s scheduled processes.71 Wind blowing “dangerous” smoke and par-
ticulates into Clewer meant that the community had to regularly “endure” these 
conditions.72  
By 1968, the definition for “noxious or offensive gas” was extended, and 
published in the South African Government Gazette.73 It aimed to more clearly 
sketch out the content of smoke emitted from industrial and mining concerns. 
The more scientifically precise definitions included polycyclic hydrocarbons, 
smoke, grit and dust. Most notably, the amended definition reflected the idea that 
not only visible smoke pollution was dangerous.74 By October 1968, the Chief 
Medical Officer of Health (MOH), who had visited Highveld Steel and Vana-
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dium the previous month, wrote to Mr Visser, then-General Manager of High-
veld.75 He informed him that processes at Highveld had now been included under 
a second schedule of industries subject to the regulations in the APPA. He 
emphasized the need to more closely monitor carbon dioxide, and suggested that 
“in view of the particularly hazardous nature of this gas a few canaries would 
possibly serve a useful purpose”.76 He also argued that because of the high 
vanadium content of Highveld’s ore, representing the “whole world consumption 
about 30 years ago”, there was a dire need for monitoring.77 The MOH further 
recommended the introduction of “periodic vanadium estimation in urine of 
employees” as the toxic effect of the element had not been established.78 The 
MOH was also concerned with how Highveld managed its iron ore dust, sewage 
and sludge disposal – as well as the way it controlled pollution when installations 
broke down. This alluded to the “massive amounts of red dust and smoke” emit-
ted during emergency shut-downs or repairs.79 By that December, Highveld had 
restored its smoke prevention devices, but the process had begun to draw atten-
tion to the need for more civil participation in the protection of Witbank’s local 
natural resources. These were being compromised by coal-based pollution, as 
well as growing awareness of “poisonous gases” that were becoming fully recog-
nized as “harmful to people and animals” with which they came into contact.80  
The Clean Air Society continued to function during the 1970s, and eventually 
became known as the National Association for Clean Air. This group recognised 
the link between clean environment and public health, and even hosted a 
conference in October, 1972, entitled ‘Smoke, the Citizen and Control.’81 It soon 
aligned with organisations such as the Institute for Public Health, whose first 
newsletter gave advice to both domestic and industrial coal users regarding air 
pollution. The newsletter identified that “smog or smoke-filled air (was) the 
cause of the lowering of the resistance of our bodies to colds, bronchitis and 
other chest ailments”.82 The newsletter advised domestic coal users to replace the 
ordinary coal stove with a smokeless one, to use anthracite or oil burning heaters, 
and not to burn refuse.  
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Awareness campaigns drew attention to the plight of those suffering from 
dust-related disease, including tuberculosis sufferers. The medico-scientific link 
between air pollution and lung disease had not been proven, but there were clear 
indications that “it certainly aggravate(d) their symptoms and increase(d) the 
frequency and severity of asthma attacks”.83 The belief that early childhood 
exposure to heavy atmospheric pollution contributed to a “lowered pulmonary 
reserve capacity in adults” meant that children from Witbank “suffered a greater 
risk of developing lung disease as adults than children raised in cleaner commu-
nities”.84  
The acknowledgement of the relationship between lung disease and coal-based 
pollution was no doubt alarming to members of the community. Already faced 
with ample evidence of the degradation of quality of air, the pollution of local 
water supplies seemed too onerous to face.  
Silent spring: Mine water pollution in Witbank  
Like air, water is not limitless, nor free, nor somehow immune to the pollution which affects 
other aspects of the environment.85 
The recognition that pollution was not only based on what was visible to the eye 
changed conceptions of pollution, and, in many ways, revolutionized responses 
to it. The Institute of Public Health continued to remind coal users to “be pol-
lution conscious”.86 This attitude went beyond pollution from any specific 
source, and began to serve as the basis for responses to water pollution as a result 
of exposure to effluents found in industrial undertakings or produced as a result 
of mine water pollution. Some of these changes are reflected in the amendments 
made to the Water Act of 1965 throughout the 1960s.  
The Water Act set in motion new debates of mine water pollution, and its first 
amendment was enacted in 1961. It specified that anyone wishing to start an 
industrial undertaking had to advise the Secretary of Water Affairs of the “nature 
and the method of purification of the waste water, effluent or waste” which 
would be produced.87 It also specified that water use for industrial purposes 
which, on average, exceeded 50,000 gallons per day had to apply to the Minister 
for a permit.  
By 1966 another amendment was made, mainly affecting the nature of res-
ponsibility held by local authorities regarding water rights. The Commission of 
Enquiry into Water Matters created the Water Research Commission (WRC) in 
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1966 to “fund strategic water research”. This had a profound effect on the way 
water pollution was conceived, and exposed new knowledge about pollution 
which had “previously been classified and thus out of the public domain”.88 One 
of its first research projects involved the analysis of human health implications 
from polluted groundwater. This paved the way for further amendments in 1969, 
including a section giving consent to local authorities to “take over the rights to 
water from a public stream from an owner of property within its area of juris-
diction, subject to compensation being paid”.89 It was anticipated that this change 
would help local authorities obtain water supplies. Section 23A of the third 
clause of the amendment, which was soon promulgated as Act No. 77 of 1969, 
provided the Minister of Water Affairs the right to take “steps against farmers” 
whose agricultural activities polluted public or private water.90 These new harsh 
terms of regulation upon farmers reflected a considerable shift away from pre-
vious state protectionist policies. It highlighted new influences affecting the 
agenda of state support. Growing reliance on multinational industry for trade and 
expansion within the mining sector set in motion a period of exponential growth 
in production and pollution in the Witbank coalfield. This growth would invari-
ably have environmental impacts, but the town was not in a position to resist this. 
The over-reliance of Witbank’s economy on coal production reinforced the idea 
that pollution was not something to be prevented, but rather to be managed. Such 
ideas were increasingly being met with continued resistance from a growing 
international environmental movement which had, by then, drawn more attention 
to new ideas around pollution – including the existence of the greenhouse effect 
and the long-term impact of water acidification.  
Local scientists and policy makers were not isolated from the global body of 
ideas around water pollution. Correspondence between departments suggests pro-
found governmental awareness and keen interest in global environmental control 
measures. These included scientific interventions in the mineral composition of 
water to supposedly remove impurities.91 South African research initiatives were 
lauded internationally, and South African scientists participated in gatherings of 
the International Association for Water Pollution Research.92 The work of the 
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South African Water Research Committee changed how water pollution was 
understood, but the rhetoric of water pollution prevention did little to ameliorate 
the exploitative strategy of industrially-oriented water management. It reflected a 
significant adaptation to a new reality of reduced water quality and availability.  
By the early 1970s, environmental concern had spilled over into mainstream 
media. The Star’s Cleaner Air, Rivers and Environment (CARE) campaign dur-
ing this period was the platform for a new legion of environmental journalists to 
draw attention to the way in which the apartheid state had “subdued the land, 
fenced in its creatures and harnessed its wild rivers”.93 Environmental journalist 
John Jordi argued that  
it was a massive task at first – foolhardy almost … but now we have emerged totally 
victorious. And it might be our trouble: Our victory was too total. In places nature has 
capitulated leaving behind poisoned, lifeless streams; exhausted infertile soil; and each 
spring becomes more silent.94  
James Clarke, another Star journalist, argued that “even if one could magically 
wave a wand” to make the mine dumps disappear, including those of Witbank, 
the veld and river beds were so “impregnated” with mine dump sand that it 
would take another century before the contaminated soil recovered.95 Clarke re-
ferred to another phenomenon related to water pollution, Eutrophication, where-
by a water source such as a dam or lake begins to “die” because of oxygen 
starvation after its plant life becomes boosted, or over-stimulated, by the ferti-
lizing properties of certain pollutants.96  
Debate around water pollution soon became as contentious as the still-ongoing 
negotiations around mitigating atmospheric pollution. Val Bolitho, regarded by 
environmental specialists during the 1970s as a “top brain on water purification”, 
argued that there was now a “very real danger of disturbing the ‘pollution 
equilibrium’ to a disastrous degree”.97 This term implied the perceived balance 
between “man’s capacity to pollute and nature’s to purify”.98 This referred to the 
diminishing capacity of the environment to receive pollution and absorb it. 
Harsher measures by the state against major polluters were strongly advocated, 
leading to the amendment of Section 23 of the Water Act in 1974.99 
South Africa’s policy of separate development, specifically the Group (Urban) 
Areas Act, compromised this pollution equilibrium. Unless it was permitted by 
the Minister of Water Affairs, Clause 29 of the Water Amendment Act of 1975 
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stipulated that “no township (could) be established on riparian land” unless it was 
permitted by the Minister of Water Affairs.100 The definition of “riparian” land 
was “not all that easy to apply” as the definition was, in itself, vague.101 Riparian 
land, according to the Act, referred to land bordering a ‘public stream’.102 This 
was defined as a  
natural stream which flows in a known and defined channel … even if the channel is dry 
during any period of the year and even if its conformation has been artificially changed … 
one would have great difficulty and would, in fact, require expert knowledge to know 
whether a stream was a public stream.103  
The Niemand Commission, created specifically for the purpose of “speeding 
up” the declaration of black townships, was thus faced with the challenge of 
demystifying vague legal definitions. It opposed the amendment, which sought to 
direct all township applications pertaining to land “bordered by a stream or 
water” to the Department of Water Affairs.104 This would prolong the decision 
making process, running contrary to the commission’s mandate of speeding up 
township proclamations.105 It seemed that the “best way” to make Section 23 
work was to “bring out a narrower definition of riparian land”.106 This formed 
one of numerous tense debates around accurately defining natural resources in 
line with their capacity to withstand pollution.  
Such contention resulted in the further amendment of the Water Act in 1975, 
where the purpose was specifically to “further define a certain offence regarding 
the pollution of water”.107 Only Clause 29, which dealt with “the establishment 
and extension of townships on riparian land likely to be inundated by public 
streams, attracted comment”.108 In Witbank, the cost of developing dense 
residential housing near water flowing downstream from active and abandoned 
coal mining operations was placed upon the African population in townships 
dotting the coalfield. Long term water acidification would result in constant 
shortages and reduced quality of supply.  
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Debates around environmental legislation were thus conceived and defined 
according to principles fundamentally at odds with pollution prevention. South 
African environmental protection was determined by a policy of selection and 
exclusion: Apartheid inalienably prejudiced those not classified as white by 
denying them access to public health and access to information around pollution 
and environmental health. Policymakers had admittedly ‘given up’ the idea of 
ameliorating the conditions of townships caught without access to services such 
as irrigation and electricity demonstrating the prejudicial conception of what was 
then regarded as ‘reasonably practicable’.  
The City of Coal, 1970-1978 
… people are leaving this place because … of this pollution … we are losing good people … 
this pollution is killing.109 
By 1970, the limitations of pillar-and-bord production were determined by the 
nature and depth of rock strata overlying the coal, as well as the thickness and 
composition of the coal seam itself. Opencast mining had become a viable 
alternative, especially with the development of more efficient earth moving and 
excavating machinery.110 The “dreadful waste” of mounting coal dumps incurred 
by contemporary mining methods would be “avoided”.111 This technical inno-
vation was thus seen as being “particularly suitable” for South African coal.112 
The introduction of open cast mining in 1971 thus triggered a dynamic shift in 
the nature of production in the Witbank coalfield.113 Open cast mining was seen 
as being both more effective and economical. By comparison, pillar-and-bord 
was seen as ineffective: opencast required less engineering dexterity, and pro-
duced more. The method involved the use of large earth-moving machinery 
which removed the land surface, removing plants and denuding fragile topsoil. 
The ecological ramifications of extracting coal in this way were severe.  
Variants of opencast mining methods had been in operation in Britain since 
1942. The method had first been employed in the United States during the 1940s, 
where it was seen as far more convenient for removing thick seams of coal 
trapped in the steep ranges of the North American terrain. As methods developed, 
strip mining became increasingly more employable; it was easier and more 
profitable most of the time – and by the late 1970s, a variety of techniques had 
been developed to suit the specific formation of diverse coalfields worldwide.114 
This method made liberal use of explosives to access seams. The reduced capital 
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cost of this method allowed for greater strategic intervention in engineering, 
leading to exponential growth figures in the local market.  
By 1976 the South African mining industry experienced massive expansion as 
a result of engineering developments such as open cast mining, coupled with the 
construction of Richard’s Bay Coal Terminal. Witbank coal demand was also 
stimulated by the “oil revolution” created by the Oil-Producing Export Countries 
(OPEC) embargo of 1973, which had increased the price of oil from approxi-
mately $2 to around $35 per barrel by the end of the decade.115  
One early opencast mine included the R200 million Rietspruit mine, which 
began operations in 1978. The success of monitoring and evaluation of coal-
based pollution of local major polluters like Rand Carbide was significantly 
undermined by the exponential growth of the coal industry within the first decade 
after the APPA was promulgated.116 Knowing the environmental impact of 
underground mining, opencast mining was conceived as somewhat safer, as the 
process of rehabilitating the land after mining took place was considered to be 
easier. Topsoil and broken rock from explosives were piled up on one side, and 
after the layer of coal was removed, the land was supposedly left “the way it 
was”.117 Companies would often plant black wattles around the mines, so “no one 
(could) see that there (was) no rehabilitation”.118 The “back-fill” of soil and rocks 
broken from solid underground layers resulted in a trench which was “never as 
compact”.119 Land would generally sink as it settled, leaving a visible depression 
in the land; eventually, it filled up with water and overflowed, setting in motion 
the long-term process of water acidification known as acid mine drainage 
(AMD).120 AMD referred to the reduced pH level of water retained in mines. 
When the underground water eventually seeps out of the mines, it leaches the 
soil, picking up minerals such as manganese and mercury. These particles, com-
monly known as total dissolved solids (TDS), pose a threat to public health when 
ingested.  
Both local and international capacity to ‘adapt’ to pollution was becoming 
limited over the course of the 1970s. The broader impact of pollution on public 
health could no longer be ignored. The strength of the environmentalist lobby 
was consolidated with the emergence of statutory bodies such as the EPA. This 
body understood environmental disease to be the “disease of the century” and 
argued that environmental protection “must become the most important ingre-
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dient in any national health program”.121 In South Africa, organisations such as 
the South African Council for Conservation and Anti-Pollution vilified the “apa-
thetic attitude of officialdom”, reflecting significant cleavages between the state 
and civil society over environmental policy.122 Pollution was still seen as some-
thing to which society could, and should, adapt, particularly in line with growing 
energy requirements. By 1978 the Secretary for Environmental Planning and 
Energy argued that the cost of energy derived from fossil fuels would continue to 
increase.123  
 
 
 
Photo 5.1 Transporting bags of coal. 
A resident of the Old Coronation Colliery informal settlement transporting bags of 
coal gathered from the ash heap of the abandoned pre-war coal dumps of the 
Coronation Colliery outside of Witbank, Emalahleni, June 2, 2008. [photo: Michal 
Singer] 
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Conclusion 
Environmental conditions in the Witbank coalfield have steadily deteriorated, 
and will continue to do so, into the twenty-first century. However, conceptions of 
coal-based pollution had changed dramatically by the late twentieth century, 
particularly owing to the growing incidence of land decay and poor health. This 
chapter has demonstrated these changes through making reference to Witbank, 
where stakeholders had little choice but to adapt to new regulations governing 
pollution. This included both the introduction of industrial pollution control 
measures and the emergence of a more visible civil sector which made recourse 
to the APPA to affect local change. Despite the growing opposition to severe 
levels of coal-based pollution in the region, the control and prevention of pol-
lution was obstructed by the continued economic centrality of coal.  
Postscript 
‘Act local, think global’: Environmental justice in the Witbank coalfield,  
1978-2009 
This study has placed changing conceptions of coal-based pollution in historical 
context. The narrative ends in 1978, when the switch to opencast provided ex-
ponential growth opportunities to the local industry, resulting in previously un-
precedented scales of coal production, sales and related pollution. Issues around 
coal-based pollution have continued to gain momentum, causing significant 
levels of public concern. The study has provided a framework for understanding 
the complex and strained politics related to contemporary environmental justice 
in South Africa and, more specifically, in Witbank. This postscript briefly ex-
plores the environmental politics specific to Witbank, further demonstrating the 
relevance of this town as a unit of historical study. It addresses the need for a 
greater understanding of pollution and its role in South African energy politics.  
Both local and global demand for coal had grown exponentially by the end of the 
1970s, with seventeen separate active coalfields situated within the Witbank 
district.124 The region had become South Africa’s “energy nucleus”, contributing 
to the majority of Richard’s Bay’s rising export figures, with 24.9 million ton 
coal export in 1980 and 25.7 million ton coal export by 1981.125 By 1981, 
Witbank’s opencast Rietspruit mine had already earned R300 million in foreign 
currency.126 Opencast did not entirely replace underground production, and pillar 
and bord techniques were refined to enable more efficient rates of extraction. In 
fact, by October, the long-established Witbank Colliery had sold its highest ever 
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monthly tonnage, over a million tons.127 By the middle of the decade, the 
proximity of new residential areas to abandoned mines had increased exposure to 
unrestricted, and often dangerous, sites. In response to a number of residents 
falling into burning pits close to dumps, efforts were made from this point by the 
Witbank town council to fence in the burning ground.128 This did not satisfy a 
growing opposition of local residents, whose lives were overwhelmingly affected 
by coal-based pollution.  
 
 
 
Photo 5.2 Exposed mine pit at the abandoned site of the Trans-
vaal & Delagoa Bay Colliery, situated not far from the 
industrial complex bordering the town of Witbank, 
June 2, 2008. [photo: Michal Singer] 
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By 1980 Witbank’s pollution was reconceived in line with racial inequity.129 
These understandings linked coal-based pollution to the disproportionately high 
prevalence of diseases such as tuberculosis by the “black working class … as 
compared to the other economic sectors of the population”.130 Findings in Wit-
bank have revealed that few residents understand the full implications of coal-
based pollution. Many see it “as this normal thing – staying around a mine”.131 
Contributing to the health implications of coal-based pollution is the pervasive 
lack of services and education to residents of informal settlements near sites of 
past mining activity. An evaluation of the impact of coal-based pollution in the 
Witbank district has demonstrated the dangers of ongoing South African coal 
mining activity. By 2000, tests showed that the quality of water flowing into the 
Witbank Dam was too polluted for use in power generation. Water had to be 
pumped from the Komati and Usuthu Rivers to the Witbank area.132 With limited 
effect, numerous experimental rehabilitation projects have attempted to prevent 
rising underground water from workings, eliminating risk factors related to 
AMD.133 South African scientists have predicted that the rising incidence of 
AMD running over the Witbank coalfield could take up to five hundred years to 
normalize.134 In spite of such predictions, it is almost impossible to tell what the 
“exact impact will be until it actually hits”.135  
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6 
Conclusion 
This book has highlighted evolving understandings of Witbank coal, from a 
valued commodity and source of energy, to a destructive source of coal-based 
pollution. This has elucidated key responses to these changing conceptions by the 
State, local industry, the civil sector, as well as Witbank’s local residents. The 
study has demonstrated how coal-based pollution was understood in light of 
visible environmental damage, as well as scientific knowledge of these changes. 
Based on findings, it therefore concluded that changes in understanding were 
strongly influenced by the appearance of pollution, but this did little to affect 
change within the framework of rapid and intensive urbanization. 
Finding a comprehensive explanation for pollution remained a central chal-
lenge in producing this study. It was necessary to explore what was meant by 
pollution. An historical assessment of evolving ideas of coal-based pollution 
required some sense of its existence. This study has revealed the relationship 
between broader understanding of, and responses to, the pervasive problem of 
coal-based pollution. The first chapter has demonstrated this by depicting the 
early existence of coal trade in the town, as well as early observations of coal’s 
properties. Reference to early twentieth century legislation has shown how coal-
based pollution was conceived by law, and how this directly influenced regula-
tions over industrial emissions and effluent. Archival references have revealed 
limited conception of the destructive capacity of industrial activity in the early 
twentieth century. Reports of tests conducted to test the quality of coal during 
combustion reflected a superficial understanding of its chemical composition. 
Such gaps in understanding reveal the way in which early signs of coal-based 
pollution were, to a large extent, ignored. Where attention was given to pollution 
in early legislation, regulations imposed were tentative, and rarely implemented.  
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Photo 6.1 Residents collect pieces of low-grade bituminous coal found along the ash heap of 
abandoned mine dumps of the old Coronation Colliery. Isaac Mampane, a key 
informant in Witbank, is featured on the right. Behind the dump, the edges of the 
old Coronation Colliery informal settlement can be seen, practically forming part 
of the dump itself. June 2, 2008. [photo: Michal Singer] 
 
 
The first chapter provides an analysis of this early phase of coal, when the scale 
of coal production expanded to such an extent that new signs of pollution drew 
further attention to the destructive properties of the fossil fuel.  
The establishment of Escom and Iscor in Witbank by the mid-1930s, as well 
as the steady militarization of South Africa, further marginalised existing con-
cerns about coal-based environmental damage. These industries facilitated the 
growth of a steel market in Witbank, leading to unforeseen growth in the coal 
industry. The second chapter focuses on the patterns of this growth, exploring the 
relationship between industrialization and energy production, particularly in 
stimulating the scale of coal production. It thus demonstrates the development of 
different perspectives of Witbank’s coal-based pollution within the context of a 
more developed industry.  
With the diversification of industry in the Witbank region, coal mining activity 
expanded, with severe implications for the local ecosystem. The integrity of land 
surfaces at coal mining sites was compromised by the unorthodox nature of coal 
production during the Second World War. Sound engineering principles of popu-
lar pillar-and-bord mining methods were discarded in the war-time acceleration 
of industrial production. This shaped the way in which coal-based pollution came 
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to be understood during and after the war years. The most significant indication 
of these changes was the time and energy devoted by the state to the research of 
bacteriological and chemical pollution.  
The third and fourth chapters reveal significant shifts in the way in which coal 
mining was associated with pollution. This was mainly as a result of physical 
evidence of air pollution, destruction of land, and the indefatigability of 
underground fires. The third chapter provides a summary of internal debates 
around the growing appearance of environmental changes as a result of ongoing 
coal mining activity. Coal-based pollution of isolated areas where underground 
fires raged beneath the sunken and desiccated land surface did not pose a prob-
lem to the local authorities of Witbank; neither did it disrupt economic activity, 
warranting attention by state or industry. The appearance of acute levels of atmo-
spheric pollution by the early 1950s throughout South Africa was more difficult 
to ignore.  
The second half of the twentieth century saw attempts both to define and 
monitor pollution. What became clear was the need for improved understanding 
of the phenomenon of coal-based pollution. The third chapter thus describes the 
process by which conceptions of coal-based pollution were brought into the 
realm of public discourse through the work of E.H. Halliday and the CSIR, as 
well as preliminary discussions on the APPA. Reference to documentation re-
lated to the creation of the Act reveal how much more closely definitions of 
pollution were founded on scientific understandings of pollution, particularly the 
impact of coal combustion. This again develops the overall argument by reflect-
ing how greater understanding of coal-based pollution resulted in growing con-
cern from local residents.  
The fourth chapter deals with responses to the promulgation of the APPA, 
coupled with rapidly changing perceptions of environmental concerns. As South 
Africa’s first environmental legislation directly tackling issues of pollution, the 
APPA set a precedent for renewed interest and altered perspectives on coal-based 
pollution. This had enormous ramifications for the way in which Witbank in-
dustry functioned. Local collieries and factories were now required to conform to 
environmental control and monitoring by the State, and also to introduce efforts 
geared towards environmental mitigation. This changed the way the local coal 
industry approached pollution, but did little to halt the scale of growth experien-
ced by the coal industry by the late 1970s. The fourth chapter evaluates the 
efficiency of regulations introduced with the APPA, particularly in light of con-
tinued growth in the scale of Witbank coal production. With the introduction of 
opencast mining, the scale of coal production grew exponentially, in spite of 
more fully developed conceptions of the environmental implications of this ac-
tivity, particularly in the already-compromised Witbank environment.  
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I have provided an historical analysis of changing ideas around coal and its 
environmental impact. It thus contributes to the growing body of knowledge on 
climate change. Its value is emphasized by the continued importance of coal in 
South Africa as a staple source of energy, in spite of common knowledge of its 
dire environmental implications. Recent claims that “declining coal reserves” are 
the root of energy problems in South Africa reflect considerable changes in the 
way coal has been understood as a natural resource.1 Contemporary attitudes 
towards coal-based pollution remain fraught with misrepresentation and prevari-
cation. Processes of pollution thus require further study in South Africa, as rela-
tively little is known about the full extent of environmental impacts of early 
twentieth century coal mining. This work, therefore, is a first attempt at opening 
up the enigma that surrounds the environmental impact of coal mining in South 
Africa.  
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